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Abstract 
Corporate Governance in Socially Responsible Firms 
Elizabeth Webb 
Edward Nelling, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
This study extends the analysis of agency relations to include all stakeholders by 
investigating the corporate governance structure of socially responsible (SR) firms. Using 
a sample of 394 SR firms and comparing these to a matched sample of firms, I find that 
that the SR firms have characteristics associated with effective board structures.  They 
have a larger proportion of outsiders and women on the board, and are less likely to have 
a CEO who is also the chairman of the board.  Further, these results are robust to changes 
in sample, signifying that these characteristics are indicative of effective boards. This 
suggests that SR boards are better able to alleviate agency problems between managers 
and shareholders than are non-SR boards due to their promotion of firm stakeholders.  
 I also examine the effectiveness of SR boards by investigating evidence of 
monitoring. I focus on two important and observable board monitoring roles: CEO 
compensation and CEO replacement.  CEO turnover tests indicate that SR firms are more 
likely to experience CEO turnover following poor performance than are non-SR firms. 
Analysis of CEO compensation indicates that SR firms exhibit weaker pay-for-
performance sensitivity than non-SR firms; however, higher sensitivity is likely not 
necessary at SR firms.  Furthermore, option grants to CEOs of SR firms do not appear to 
result in future risk taking behavior, whereas such grants are significantly related to 
future risk at non-SR firms. Overall, results indicate that the boards of directors of SR 
firms are effective monitors.   
 viii
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
 
Chapter 1.  The Board Structure of Socially Responsible Firms 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 With the crash of tech stocks in the late 1990s and the proliferation of corporate 
accounting scandals a few years later, corporate governance has become a central issue in 
the business world.  A climate of distrust exists, where the discourse between investors 
and managers has been damaged.  Corporate governance, in the form of the board of 
directors, serves as the ultimate internal control mechanism by aligning firm insiders and 
outsiders.  The board thus has the opportunity and the ability to ensure a truthful flow of 
information between shareholders and managers of the firm, even during a time of crisis. 
The strength and independence of the board of directors then becomes a fundamental 
concern, as firms with strong boards may be more likely to survive current predicaments. 
 A critical aspect of the relationship between investors and management is the 
degree to which investors perceive that managers value firm stakeholders.  Stakeholders 
include any party that is affected by firm actions, such as customers, suppliers, the 
community, employees, and shareholders.  John and Senbet (1998) suggest that those 
managers conscious of the firms influence on stakeholders will have decreased the 
agency problem, since respective interests of shareholders and management have become 
more closely aligned.  Tirole (2001) states that the goal of corporate governance should 
be to promote stakeholders of the firm in addition to the firms shareholders.  This 
expands the traditional definition of corporate governance to include stakeholders beyond 
the firms shareholders.  Socially responsible firms fit the description of those firms that 
are likely to address their stakeholders interests.  
  
2
 The quest to find firms that are actively concerned about stakeholders is not a new 
phenomenon. Since the August 1971 launch of the Pax World Balance Fund, the first 
mutual fund in the U.S. to use broad-based social and financial criteria for screening 
purposes, green mutual funds have flourished in the past three decades. Socially 
responsible (SR) funds generally are comprised of the equity of firms that are screened on 
the basis of several characteristics of stakeholder awareness including community 
investment, environmental issues, employment practices, and shareholder rights.  
According to the Social Investment Forum, nearly $1 of every $8 under professional 
management in the U.S. is in a socially responsible portfolio, and social investment grew 
from $1.185 trillion in 1997 to $2.16 trillion in 1999.  This growth rate is roughly twice 
that of all assets under professional management in the United States.  By 2003, Lipper 
reported that 199 socially responsible investment funds were in existence, up from 88 
funds in 1999. 
 Increased demand for SR funds may be a result of a change in investor principles, 
or simply the attraction of strong long-term performance records that many funds exhibit. 
Several studies, such as Goldreyer and Diltz (1999) and Sauer (1997), have shown that 
socially screened indexes have consistently outperformed the S&P 500 index, and that 
portfolios of SR firms outperform benchmark portfolios.   
The purpose of this study is to analyze those firms that have shown stakeholder 
consideration in an attempt to discover any differences between the corporate governance 
structures of these socially responsible firms as compared to non-designated SR firms.  
The results show that socially responsible firms have a majority of outside directors on 
the board, more women directors than non-SR boards, more directors holding three or 
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more other directorships (or busy directors), more CEOs on the board, and a lower 
probability that the chairman of the board is also the firms CEO.  
This study adds to the growing finance literature on the agency theory explanation 
of corporate governance.  Specifically, it shows how firms characterized as socially 
responsible are better able to minimize agency problems through effective board structure 
arrangements.  Also, SR firms offer a unique sample to test the theory that agency 
relations extends to all stakeholders.  This study begins to fill a research gap that exists 
concerning socially responsible firms, as they are a prevalent force in todays business 
environment yet have not been explicitly analyzed before in the finance literature. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 reviews the literature on 
agency theory, board structure, and socially responsible firms, and presents hypotheses; 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology; Section 4 analyzes the results; and Section 
5 concludes. 
 
1.2  Literature Review and Hypotheses 
1.2.1. Agency Theory and Board Structure 
 A companys board of directors is elected by shareholders to carry out certain 
functions that best serve shareholder interests.  The board has the authority to elect firm 
managers including the CEO, provide counsel, make final decisions regarding the 
functioning of the firm, and monitor management in order to carry out their 
responsibilities as shareholder representatives.  A board of directors is necessary in light 
of the agency problem, as first described by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  Managers 
(agents), chosen by the board, should act with the interest of shareholders (principals) in 
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mind.  But individuals, assumed to be utility maximizers, have the potential for conflicts 
of interest when the needs of the principal differ from that of the agent. This conflict is 
the agency problem, and to alleviate the problem, interests must be aligned.  Aligning 
interests comes at a monitoring cost to the shareholders.  The board of directors acts on 
shareholders behalf to monitor managers as a market solution to the contracting 
problems inherent in organizations.  This helps to reduce agency problems and 
monitoring costs between the shareholders and managers, who may not be as vigilant as 
shareholders would prefer. 
 Since the board of directors provides an important monitoring function for 
shareholders, it is in the best interests of the shareholders to find the preferred or optimal 
board structure.  Defining the optimal board structure requires a theoretical model that 
has yet to be established in the literature.  Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) investigate the 
theoretical reasoning for board existence, rather than optimal board structure.  They show 
that boards are critical to shareholders who must trust directors with their money.  The 
idea is not a complete model, however, nor does it explore optimal board structure.  Until 
a comprehensive theoretical model is created, new studies on boards of directors must 
rely on results of empirical investigations. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) note that empirical research on corporate 
governance structures tries to address three main issues: how board characteristics are 
related to profitability, how board characteristics affect the observable actions of the 
board, and the factors that affect the makeup of boards and how they evolve over time.  
The results of over twenty years of board structure research indicate that strong boards 
are those that can best alleviate agency problems between shareholders and managers 
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through independent internal control.  The idea that an independent board is more 
effective than a non-independent board results from the hypothesis that independent 
directors are more apt to perform their duties on behalf of the shareholders, and not fall 
into complacency, since they have limited incentive to neglect shareholders in favor of 
managers.  Jensen (1993) describes how in a changing business environment, internal 
control systems must make adjustments and not abandon shareholder needs.  Complacent 
boards result from lack of independence among directors, and a board culture that 
rewards consent and discourages conflict.  
 A strong board of directors is thus one that possesses characteristics that enable it 
to effectively monitor management and alleviate agency problems.  In a survey paper on 
corporate governance and board effectiveness, John and Senbet (1998) find that the 
standard view in the empirical governance literature is that the degree of board 
independence is related to composition, and that independence fosters board 
effectiveness.  Fama (1980) asserts that the efficient form economic organization should 
consist of a separation of ownership and control.  Fama and Jensen (1983) specify that 
the separation of ownership and control should extend to the board of directors, since the 
board acts as a monitor of the contracts between agents with conflicting interests.  Since 
then, the idea independent boards are better monitors than non-independent boards has 
taken hold in American corporate governance literature and practice.  Jensen (1993) 
provides several prospective characteristics of a strong board, including one with a 
majority of outside directors (those not employed by the firm), small size, greater equity 
ownership, and a CEO who is not also the board chair.   
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Evidence that a weak governance structure is associated with agency problems 
and subsequent poor performance is documented by Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and 
Lapides (2000).  The authors analyze the board characteristics of firms with instances of 
financial statement fraud and compare these results to a benchmark sample.  Results 
indicate that the fraudulent companies have weak (ineffective) governance structures 
relative to the benchmark (no-fraud) firms.   The no-fraud firms have more outsiders on 
the board, shorter tenure for board members, less chance that the CEO is the founder of 
the firm, smaller probability that the CEO is the chairman of the board, and are more 
likely to have a blockholder (a shareholder holding more than 5% of the outstanding 
stock) on the board than fraud firms.  Likewise, Kole and Lehn (1999) find that after 
deregulation of the airline industry in 1976, the governance structure of airline companies 
shifts toward a strong form by increasing the percentage of outside directors and 
decreasing board size.  They suggest that agency problems are alleviated after 
deregulation because shareholders must monitor the firm closer than they had done 
previously. 
Several studies support the hypothesis that independent boards are superior to a 
dependent governance structure.  Howton, Howton, and Olson (2001) analyze board 
structure and IPO underpricing.  The authors show that because of the monitoring 
function provided by board members for shareholders of the firm, a strong board (more 
outside ownership) will alleviate agency problems between the two parties by reducing 
asymmetric information.  This, in turn, reduces underpricing of initial public offerings 
since, as identified by Beatty and Ritter (1986), underpricing and information 
asymmetries are directly related.  In addition, Crutchley, Garner, and Marshall (2002) 
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find that board independence is lower for that of less-stable boards.  They define stability 
as the frequency and scope of change in the board of directors over time.  The implication 
is that a stronger board, as proxied by board stability, is directly related to the proportion 
of independent directors on the board. 
 Evidence on a wide range of board characteristics associated with board strength 
is compiled by Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999).  Their results indicate that firms 
with weaker governance structures have more agency problems, and that these firms tend 
to perform worse than more strongly governed firms. The authors use CEO compensation 
as a metric for board effectiveness.  They hypothesize that board characteristics should 
not be directly related to levels of compensation, since these levels should be completely 
described by the economic determinants of compensation level.  They find an inverse 
relationship between board strength and characteristics such as the percentage of the 
board composed of inside directors, board size, gray directors (those directors who are 
not officially an insider, but perform substantial services for the firm), directors over the 
age of 69, busy directors (directors on three or more other boards), and when the CEO is 
also the board chair.  The next section describes these variables as well as other board 
structure characteristics in detail. 
 
1.2.1.1 Board Size 
As first hypothesized and tested in Lipton and Lorsch (1992), board size is found 
to be negatively related to board efficiency.  The benefit of adding more directors to the 
board is outweighed by the incremental cost of poorer communication associated with 
larger groups.  Board size is analyzed in depth in Yermack (1996). Yermacks results 
show an inverse relationship between firm value and board size, suggesting that small 
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boards tend to be more effective than large boards.  In addition, Yermack finds that 
boards chaired by non-executives or non-CEOs improve valuation for all board sizes.  
But others have criticized this one size fits all explanation of board size.  Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) propose that studies of board size may be estimated in an out-of-
equilibrium situation rather than in a state of equilibrium.  In other words, if the studies 
showing inverse relationships between board size and performance where capturing an 
equilibrium phenomenon, we should no longer see large boards in existence.  But one 
look at the board sizes in the banking industry, for example, would prove that this is not 
the case. This idea then prohibits concluding across all firms that smaller boards are more 
effective than larger boards.  In fact, Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2002) point out that in 
some industries, the benefits of a large board outweigh the communication costs, and 
therefore smaller board sizes are not optimal in these cases. 
   
1.2.1.2 Diversity 
Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) find that board strength and firm value are 
enhanced by board diversity.  Specifically, a positive relationship exists between the 
percentage of women on the board and Tobins Q, and between the fraction of minorities 
(African-Americans, Asians, and Hispanics) on the board and Tobins Q.  The authors 
use the argument that board diversity increases independence, thereby alleviating agency 
problems, and this contributes to board strength.  They also attribute the results to the 
reduction of agency problems, since independent, diverse outside directors are less likely 
to collude with other directors to subvert shareholders than are more homogenous boards.   
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1.2.1.3 Inside and Gray Directors 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) report that during the 1970s, board composition 
moved toward greater independence, and that boards with more outsiders performed 
better than those with a majority of insiders.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) also look at 
board independence and the relationship between stock market reaction to inside director 
appointments and insider stock ownership.  They find mixed results.  A significantly 
positive reaction occurs only when insiders own between 5 and 25 percent of the firms 
common stock, and a significant negative and zero reaction occur when insiders own very 
little or a very large portion of stock, respectively.   
In addition to inside directors, there is a growing interest of so-called gray 
directors on the board.  These directors receive payments from the company in excess of 
director compensation.  Examples include attorneys or business consultants who provide 
services to the company but are not employed directly by the firm.  Cornett and Davidson 
(1997) find that insider and gray board member stock ownership is positively related to 
the abnormal returns at the announcement of recapitalizations.  They find that when 
insiders and gray directors own large amounts of the firms stock, the boards are more 
motivated to protect the shareholders and run the firm efficiently than when the affiliated 
directors are not substantial shareholders.  Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) find that 
the percentage of gray directors and CEO compensation levels are directly related.  Since 
the authors metric for effective board characteristics is whether or not the characteristic 
influences CEO compensation, they conclude that gray directors do not contribute to 
overall board effectiveness.  These results suggest that like insiders, gray directors on the 
board lessen the monitoring power and independence of the governance structure. 
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1.2.1.4 Outside Directors 
Boards dominated with outside directors are argued to be better able to monitor 
and control managers since domination by insiders on the board can lead to collusion and 
the transformation of stockholder wealth (Fama 1980).  In addition, outsiders may be 
more likely to act as expert directors and will monitor and participate more productively 
than inside directors.  Thus, the percentage of outside directors becomes an important 
determinant of board independence.  Winter (1977) describes how outside directors can 
question managers and provide criticism that insiders may not be able to supply due to 
pride and commitment to management.  Weisbach (1988) shows that the monitoring 
function of the board is enhanced with outside directors since outside-dominated boards 
are more likely than inside-dominated boards to replace CEOs in response to poor 
performance.  Outsiders on the board are valued by shareholders as documented by 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990).  Here, the authors find a positive abnormal stock return 
associated with adding outsiders to the board of directors.  Beasley (1996) finds that the 
proportion of outside members on the board of directors is lower for firms experiencing 
financial statement fraud than for no-fraud firms.  Results also indicate that blockholders 
on the board of directors (outside shareholders owning more than 5 percent of 
outstanding stock in the company) create further board independence, and are therefore 
more likely to be present in the no-fraud firm sample. 
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1.2.1.5 Founding Family CEO 
Another governance variable of interest is whether or not the CEO is part of the 
founding family.  In the United States, most founders hire professional managers rather 
than an heir to become the new CEO when the founder decides to leave.  Burkart, 
Panunzi, and Shleifer (2002) present a theoretical model describing management 
succession in firms controlled and managed by the founder.  They show that founders 
tend to choose professional managers (assumed to be more talented than an heir) in legal 
regimes that have the highest protection of minority shareholders.  Where legal regimes 
are weakest, the founder designates an heir to manage the firm and ownership remains in 
the family.  This is consistent with empirical evidence showing that family management 
is generally inferior to professional management (Morck, Stangeland, and Yeong, 2000, 
and Perez-Gonzales 2001).  The expectation then is that firms with founding family 
CEOs would have poorer control over the agency problem since the difference between 
family and outside ownership levels is wide.   
Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling, and Covin (2000) show that performance is 
affected by firm size when the CEO is also the founder of the firm.  They find that the 
relationship between stock performance and founder management (where CEO is the 
founder of the firm) is positive for small firms yet negative for large firms. Despite the 
warning by Jensen (1993) and others that the board of directors should not include the 
CEO, the CEO is a member, if not the chairman, of almost all U.S. boards.  Since a 
stronger governance structure is associated with limitations of the agency problem, more 
effective boards that include the CEO should be governed by CEOs who are not part of 
the founding family.  It also follows that boards comprised of family members (in which 
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one or more directors is related to another director) are not as independent as boards that 
do not have family connections.  A prevalent reason for inviting family members to join 
the board of directors is to keep control within the family, which leads to a weakening of 
the monitoring function of the board, entrenchment, and a less effective governance 
mechanism. 
 
1.2.1.6 Age of Directors and CEO 
The age of directors, as well as the age of the CEO, has also been important in 
governance structure literature.  Many reforms today advocate mandatory retirement ages 
for both directors and CEOs and term limits for each position.   The reform initiatives 
stem from the idea that as board members and CEOs get older, they become more 
complacent and are less likely to initiate change and conflict when it is needed.  Older 
board members may be less likely to fulfill their directorial duties productively and older 
CEOs may lose touch with current stakeholders.  Given this logic, stronger boards should 
be composed of younger directors with younger CEOs.  Core, Holthausen and Larcker 
(1999) use age 70 as the cutoff describing a senior director.   
 
1.2.1.7 Busy Directors 
The relationship between board effectiveness and busy directors is ambiguous 
in the literature.  Shivdasani (1993) uses busy as a corporate governance variable to 
describe directors who have additional directorships.  He finds that when directors are 
busy, it is less likely for the firm to be a hostile takeover target.  One reason for this could 
be that busy directors are the highest quality directors, which leads these individuals to be 
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asked to be on many boards.  A contradictory reason is that these directors have a 
reputation for complacency, and therefore pose no threat to managers and CEOs who 
want to control the firm.  Also, busy directors may not have enough time to allocate to 
their director duties to each firm if they are on the boards of more than one firm.  Ferris, 
Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003) find that multiple directorships are positively related to 
firm performance, indicating that busy directors do not evade their duties.  They also find 
that busy directors are not associated with a greater likelihood of securities fraud 
litigation.  These directors appear to be busy because they are in high demand due to the 
quality of their governance duties, not for patterns of complacency. Therefore, the 
hypothesis made here is that busy directors should add effectiveness to the board of 
directors.  The same argument holds for outside directors who are also CEOs of other 
companies. 
 
1.2.1.8 Director Elections 
Bacon, Cornett, and Davidson (1997) study dual-class recapitalizations and the 
role of the board of directors in protecting shareholder rights.  The shareholder wealth 
hypothesis states shareholders approve a firms decision of issuing a second class of 
stock since, in the event of a takeover, managers will have more bargaining power.  The 
management entrenchment hypothesis takes the alternative view that dual-class 
recapitalizations give more control to inefficient managers. They find that 
announcements of dual-class recapitalizations in the presence of staggered elections are 
met with positive abnormal returns.  They conclude that staggered boards entrench 
managers, and that dual-class recapitalizations then do not contribute to entrenchment, 
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but, more in line with the shareholder wealth hypothesis, give managers more bargaining 
power in the event of a takeover.  This study also finds that the number of times the board 
meets during the year is related to abnormal returns.  Boards that meet more than six 
times per year are associated with negative abnormal returns and boards that meet less 
than six times have positive abnormal returns.  This result is consistent with the 
management entrenchment hypothesis since more board meetings mean more time for 
managers to align outside directors interests with that of management.  Additionally, 
poorly performing firms tend to experience more problems that require board attention, 
and the need for more meetings develops as a result. 
To summarize this growing body of literature, Table 1.1 describes relationships 
between board characteristics and board strength in terms of ability to alleviate agency 
problems.  These characteristics will later give rise to the current studys hypotheses.  
 
[insert Table 1.1 about here] 
 
1.2.2 Incorporating Social Responsibility 
While corporate governance and board structure are becoming mainstream 
financial topics in academic literature, the area of social responsibility has received much 
less attention.  Since socially responsible investing has become an increasingly important 
topic, it is worthwhile to examine issues related to corporate social responsibility as well. 
Milton Friedman first defined corporate social responsibility in 1970 when he 
said that it is to conduct the business in accordance with shareholders desires, which 
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules 
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of society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.  More 
recently, Carroll (1991) uses a broader definition of corporate social responsibility.  
According to Carroll, corporate social responsibility refers to a business entitys 
attention to and fulfillment of responsibilities to multiple stakeholders which exist at 
various levels: economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic.  Socially responsible (SR) 
firms therefore are those firms considered to be positively affecting a broad class of 
stakeholders. 
Managers may be lax to introduce social responsibility into the corporate culture 
of a firm.  Often, the short-term costs are perceived to outweigh the long-term benefits.  
Early evidence on the financial effects of SR is ambiguous. In a survey paper by Arlow 
and Gannon (1982), results are mixed as to whether or not social responsibility and 
economic performance (as measured by EPS, net income, ROE, and common stock price) 
are related.   
 More recently, studies suggest that there exists a positive relationship between 
corporate social responsibility and financial performance. Waddock and Graves (1997) 
address the question of whether corporate social performance (CSP) and financial 
performance are related.  Using a constructed index from the firm Kinder, Lydenberg, 
and Domini and financial statement data, they find that CSP and profitability are 
positively related.1  They suggest that causality goes both ways in that firms with strong 
financial performance have slack resources that can be spent on CSP measures, and that 
good social performance may be linked to good managerial practice, which in turn 
leads to strong financial performance.   
                                                
1 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. is an agency that reports company profiles based on different aspects 
of social responsibility including charitable giving, community involvement, diversity, employee welfare, 
and the natural environment. 
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These results support earlier evidence by McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis 
(1988), who find a positive relationship between SR and financial performance.  In this 
study, the authors use corporate reputation ratings from Fortune magazine as a social 
responsibility metric.  Using both prior- and post-performance measures, they find that 
prior accounting-based performance measures explain more of the variation in corporate 
reputation ratings than do prior stock returns.  However, prior measures of performance 
(both accounting- and market-based) are more closely related to corporate reputation 
ratings than post measures of performance. 
 Verschoor and Murphy (2002) use the list of 100 Top U.S. Best Corporate 
Citizens published annually in Business Ethics magazine and three financial performance 
rankings to conclude that firms with strong social values have superior financial 
performance.  This relationship holds in foreign markets as well.  Pearson (2000) 
suggests that U.K. firms that are perceived as trustworthy have greater long-term success 
than firms not perceived as trustworthy.  The author finds that firms supporting corporate 
philanthropy in areas related to their business activities have more transparency between 
management and stakeholders, and found them to exhibit greater long-run performance 
than firms not involved in philanthropic activities.  Pearsons result is supported by 
Hillman and Keim (2001), who show that stakeholder management and shareholder value 
are directly correlated, while social issue participation hurts performance.  
 Given the strong performance of SR firms and their attentiveness to stakeholders, 
these firms may have more effective governance structures in place than their non-SR 
counterparts.  Since agency costs may be lower at SR firms, they offer a unique sample to 
test the proposition that corporate governance is enhanced through stakeholder 
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consideration. Indeed, Tirole (2001) defines corporate governance itself as the design of 
institutions that induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders.  
This shift in corporate governance away from a complete focus on the shareholders to 
that of concentrating on all stakeholders should be reflected in the strength of the board 
of directors. 
A recent article in the financial press suggests that stock exchanges should make 
several corporate governance reforms to correct the fraudulent activity that has created 
todays crisis in Corporate America (Byrne 2002).  Several reforms include limiting 
insiders to two or fewer members, having a lead director who is not CEO, and creating 
age/term restrictions to prevent entrenchment.  Most of these reforms are already in 
place on strong boards, as noted earlier.   
   This study attempts to discover any commonalities among governance structure 
characteristics of SR firms, and to compare these to a matched sample of non-designated 
socially responsible firms.  Specifically, I test to see whether or not the boards of 
directors of SR firms are different from those of non-SR firms.  As the preceding 
literature indicates, the expectation is that boards of directors from socially responsible 
firms are stronger than the boards of directors from non-designated socially responsible 
firms.   
 
1.2.3 Testable Hypotheses 
The goal of corporate governance is shifting from that of protecting the 
shareholders to being a proponent for all stakeholders.  Since socially responsible firms 
have a pattern of stakeholder consideration, their corporate governance structure should 
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be stronger.  As a visible aspect of corporate governance, the board of directors of 
socially responsible firms should be more effective than that of non-SR firms.  
The null hypothesis in this paper is that the strength of socially responsible firms 
boards of directors is equivalent to the strength of non-socially responsible boards.  The 
alternative hypothesis is that SR boards are more effective than non-SR boards.  To test 
this hypothesis, several sub-hypotheses are developed from the board of director and 
corporate social responsibility literature, and strong board characteristics should be 
associated with the socially responsible firms.  Hypotheses pertaining to board 
characteristics and control measures are outlined in the next section. 
 
1.2.3.1 Board Composition Hypotheses 
From a review of the literature on boards of directors and socially responsible 
firms, we should expect to see a prevalence of outside directors on SR boards.  Likewise, 
insiders and gray directors are expected to be more common on non-SR boards.  More 
women and busy directors are expected to be on SR boards than on non-SR boards.  
Directors who are also CEOs of other firms and family relationships among directors are 
anticipated to be less likely on SR boards than on non-SR boards.  It will be less likely 
that the chairman of the board is also the CEO on SR boards and that the CEO is part of 
the founding family.   
 Furthermore, board members from SR firms are more likely to be associated with 
non-profit organizations than are non-SR board members.  This expectation is intuitively 
developed from the idea that a socially responsible firm may attract and seek out directors 
who are conscientiously performing a civic duty.  Individuals who work for non-profit 
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organizations or volunteer a large portion of their time to community activities may be 
more likely to be a director on a firm deemed as socially responsible as on a similar board 
without that qualification.  However, Weber (2002) notes that recent attention is focused 
on whether a conflict of interest exists when outside directors are associated with non-
profit organizations that are substantially funded by the company.  Because of the 
ambivalence surrounding non-profit directors, the predicted relationship may not be 
strong.   
 
1.2.3.2 Alternative Board Measures 
 SR boards should be of similar size or smaller and meet less often than their non-
SR counterparts.  Also, fewer seniors (over age 69) and should be on SR boards, while 
older CEOs should be more prevalent on non-SR firms boards.  Additionally, SR boards 
should have annual elections rather than staggered elections of their directors.  The next 
section examines these hypotheses empirically. 
 
1. 3 Data and Methodology 
1.3.1 Data Collection and Characteristics 
To measure and compare the corporate governance structure characteristics of 
socially responsible versus non-SR firms, I use the 400 firms in the Domini Social Index 
(as of November 2001) and a matched sample.  The Domini Social Index (DSI) is a 
portfolio of ethically screened stocks.  The social investment research firm of Kinder, 
Lydenberg, Domini, & Company constructs the index.  Firms in this index must pass 
multiple broad-based social screens.  Firms must have a positive record of shareholder 
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activism, community investment, environmental concerns, human rights, employment, 
and products and services.  Firms from the alcohol, tobacco, and gambling industries, as 
well as firms involved in weapon and nuclear power production, are excluded from the 
index. 
 The Domini Social Index is not the only ethically screened portfolio in the 
market.  There are more than 199 mutual funds specifically designed for socially 
responsible investors.  Funds range from aggressive-growth small cap domestic equity 
portfolios (for example, Calvert New Vision Small Cap, and Winslow Green Growth 
Fund) to fixed income funds (Aquinas Fixed Income, and Citizens Income Fund), and 
even international portfolios (such as Enterprise Global Socially Responsive, and MMA 
Praxis International).  Each fund screens investments on the basis of several underlying 
social and environmental performance characteristics using negative (avoidance) 
screening and positive (affirmative) screening techniques.  The Calvert Social Index is 
also a broad-based social fund.  This index invests in 46% of the firms in the Domini 
Social Index as of January 2001. 
The use of the DSI is appropriate as a sample of socially responsible firms as it 
encompasses a wide range of social and environmental screens, thus providing a good 
sample of firms that are conscientious of stakeholders.  The DSI has been the established 
benchmark for measuring the effects of social screening on investment performance since 
its inception in 1990.  An important advantage for using the DSI over other available 
socially screened portfolios is that a group of independent researchers applies the same 
broad set of criteria to the firms.  The data is gathered from a range of sources, both 
internal and external to the firm, providing validity to the sample.   
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The DSI does not initially screen on corporate governance measures, but does 
include several proxy voting guidelines that promote strong governance.  However, they 
state that since this is a qualitative screen, poor performance in corporate governance 
areas does not necessarily exclude firms from consideration.  In addition, proxy votes 
from 2001 indicate that Domini Social Investments did not vote on governance issues, 
but rather stakeholder considerations.  Examples include urging AT&T to switch back 
from a cash balanced pension plan to enable more employees to receive a full pension, 
and voting that Coca-Cola Co. increase the recycled content in their bottles.2  However, 
for completeness, robustness checks are done to ensure that a sample bias does not exist 
(see Section 4). 
 I collect a matched sample of firms not designated as socially responsible (non-
SR firms).  Each firm from the DSI is matched with a non-SR firm based on industry and 
size (as in Beasley (1996)). Barber and Lyon (1997) advocate matching on firm size and 
book-to-market ratios.  However, matching by industry is an important control in board 
structure literature, since optimal board characteristics vary by industry.  For instance, 
Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) provide evidence that industry factors play an 
important part in corporate governance structure.  Differences in competitive 
environment, leverage, and investment opportunities between industries can lead to 
differences in monitoring needs, which would affect the optimal structure of the board.  
Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith (1997) and Whidbee (1997) show that the insurance and 
banking industries, respectively, require unique board structures relative to other 
industries. The non-SR firm in this study is then selected by locating the firm closest in 
                                                
2 http://www.domini.com/common/pdf/ProxyVotingGuide2002.pdf 
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market capitalization (size) to each SR firm within the same three-digit SIC code 
(industry).  Thus, a sample of 400 SR firms and 400 non-SR firms is compiled.3   
Panel A in Table 1.2 shows the characteristics of both samples from 2001.  It is 
evident that the SR firms from the Domini Social Index are larger overall than the 
matched sample.  The SR firms have significantly higher net income, total assets, market 
value, and return on assets than the non-SR sample. This is to be expected, since many of 
the firms listed in the DSI are large firms within their industry, and once a firm is 
included in the matched sample it cannot be used as a match for a subsequent SR firm.  
This results in the tendency of matched firms to be smaller than SR firms within the same 
industry. Since industry matching is important in empirical board structure research 
according to Gillan, Hertzell, and Starks (2003), size differences between samples may 
not affect overall results.  Later, this assumption is tested in the robustness checks.  Price-
to-book ratios, annual returns, and return on equity are not significantly different between 
samples.  Data on the socially responsible sample and the matched firms taken from 1998 
through 2000 show similar results (not reported).  
 
[insert Table 1.2 about here] 
 
Panel B of Table 1.2 shows the industry representation for both the SR and non-
SR samples (since they are matched by industry, both have the same representation).  
Industries are identified using the Fama and French (1997) industry assignment schedule 
which apportions firms into one of 48 industries based on four-digit SIC codes.  To 
                                                
3 The full sample of the socially responsible firms and their respective matched firms is available upon 
request. 
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conserve space, the 48 industries are divided into eight general categories.  The Domini 
Social Index and the subsequent matched sample are widely distributed in terms of 
industry.  Since industry differences can affect optimal board structure, it is important to 
have a sample with a variety of represented industries. 
 Structural characteristics of the board of directors for both samples are taken from 
proxy statements issued in 2001.4  In order to test the hypothesis that SR firms have 
stronger governance structures in place than their non-SR counterparts, sixteen board 
characteristics are analyzed as outlined in Section 2.  Variables collected from proxy 
statements include the following: the number of insiders (those directors who are 
currently employed by the firm or have been employed by the firm in the past), the 
number of outsiders (directors with no affiliation to the firm), the number of gray 
directors (directors who are have substantial business relationships with the company, yet 
are not insiders, such as lawyers, investment bankers, and consultants), the age of the 
CEO, whether or not the CEO is also the chairman of the board, board election 
procedures (staggered or annual elections), whether or not a blockholder is on the board 
(an outsider holding more than 5 percent of the outstanding stock), whether or not there 
are family relationships among board members, whether or not any members on the 
board are officers or work for non-profit organizations, the number of women on the 
board, whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family, the number of 
directors who are over the age of 69, the number of busy directors who are on three or 
more boards (six or more if the board member is retired), and the number of outside 
directors who are also CEOs of other firms. 
                                                
4 In some cases, proxy statements from 1999, 2000, or 2002 were used depending on availability.  Proxy 
statements from 2001 were used for 90% of the SR firms and 96.6% of non-SR firms. 
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 I use market value of equity, total assets, and beta as control variables in various 
robustness checks.  Firm characteristics, and industry and market capitalization data are 
collected from Compustat and CRSP, respectively.  For some firms in the sample, either 
proxy statements were not available, or certain variables (such as CEO age) were 
missing.5  The final sample of firms with all data available is 394 SR firms and 394 non-
SR firms.   
 
[insert Table 1.3 about here] 
  
In an attempt to measure the linear association between board structure variables, 
several observations can be made from the correlation matrices of each sample (Table 
1.3, Panels A, B, and C).   Both Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients are 
computed.  Spearman correlations for each sample are reported in Table 1.3.  Although 
some correlations are significantly different from zero, additional tests suggest that 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem.6 The results reveal that several 
structural characteristics that are significantly correlated in one sample are not correlated 
in the other sample of firms.   
For instance, as the number of members on the non-SR board increase, so does 
the proportion of women on the board.  However, there is also a direct correlation 
between the number of board members and the proportion of senior directors on non-SR 
boards.  This may indicate that non-SR boards attempt to diversify the board when it 
                                                
5 Most often, a lack of a proxy statement was due to mergers or bankruptcies. 
6 VIF statistics are less than 10.  The variance inflation factor (VIF) is equal to 1/(1-Ri2), where Ri2 is the 
coefficient of multiple determination between variables.   
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becomes larger and older.  The opposite appears to be true for SR boards where the 
proportion of senior directors and female directors are not correlated.  
 As an alternative measure of corporate governance, I include a Governance Index 
(GI) measure as introduced by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003).  This index gives a 
score from 0 to 24 based on the number of antitakeover provisions and governance rules 
that are included in the company bylaws.  For example, if the firm has an antigreenmail 
provision it will receive one point.  The authors conclude that strongest governance firms 
(firms with low Governance Index scores) have stronger performance records than high 
GI firms.  Firms with high scores on the Governance Index (representing firms with 
multiple takeover defenses) are then assumed to be indicative of firms with management 
entrenchment problems, where managers protect themselves from takeovers at the 
expense of the shareholders.  However, in the presence of effective boards of directors, 
the negative connotation inherent in takeover defense provisions can be reduced. For 
instance, Malekzadeh, McWilliams, and Sen (1998) and McWilliams and Sen (1997) find 
that the structure of the board influences the markets reaction to antitakeover charter 
amendments.  Specifically, McWilliams and Sen (1997) show that the market reacts 
negatively to antitakeover announcements, and this reaction is more pronounced when 
the board is dominated by insider and gray directors, and where the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board.  Because strong boards already promote shareholder rights, the 
provisions measured by the GI score are less detrimental to firm owners than they would 
be without a strong board in place.  Further, Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) find that 
board structure variables and charter provisions studied together have off-setting results, 
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since strong board characteristics confound strong governance provision characteristics, 
and vice versa.   
In the presence of a strong board, antitakeover amendments can also be used as 
tools to protect the shareholders in the event of a takeover.  For instance, Bacon, Cornett, 
and Davidson (1997) study influences of board characteristics on dual-class 
recapitalizations and find that effective board characteristics lead to positive abnormal 
returns around the announcement of the issue, thus contradicting the management 
entrenchment hypothesis of takeover defenses.  Since board structure can confound the 
nature of antitakeover amendments, firms with stronger board characteristics in place can 
afford to have more takeover provisions without contributing to management 
entrenchment.  For this reason, the hypothesis is that SR firms should have lower GI 
scores than the non-SR firms, but that this difference may be small. 
 Data on director compensation is obtained from proxy statements.  An additional 
variable is collected for a portion of the total sample from the KLD Socrates Database.  
This database compiles a continuous scoring mechanism that rates companies on the 
various degrees of social responsibility including community, diversity, employee 
interests, environment, and shareholder interests. 
 
1.3.2 Methodology 
Univariate and multivariate analyses are used to test the hypothesis that SR boards 
are stronger than non-SR boards. A two-sample paired t-test and nonparametric paired 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for difference of means are used in order to compare specific 
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board structure variables between socially responsible and non-designated SR firms in a 
univariate setting.   
 Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between firm type (either 
SR or non-SR) and board structure in a multivariate setting. The equation is as follows: 
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where y = 1 if the firm is socially responsible, 0 otherwise, and X is the vector of the 
sixteen governance structure variables described in the previous section and β is the 
vector of parameters plus an intercept term. 
  An additional measure of board effectiveness is sensitivity of director 
compensation to board structure.  To test this, I regress the number of stock options and 
annual cash retainer granted to directors on board structure and economic determinants of 
compensation.  Also, by using a continuous measure of social responsibility I am able to 
analyze the board structures effect on corporate social responsibility.  To see whether or 
not these board characteristics are related to an overall social responsibility score, I report 
a multiple regression model with the KLD score as the dependent variable and the board 
data as independent variables.   
 
1.4 Results 
 
1.4.1 Univariate Statistics 
 I document the results for the two-sample paired t-tests and Wilcoxon rank sum 
tests in Table 1.4.  Both tests give similar results.  There is a statistically significant 
difference between SR and non-SR firms for ten of the seventeen governance structure 
variables (including Governance Index score).  For nine of the ten significant board 
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structure variables, the hypothesized relationships between governance variables of SR 
and non-SR firms are supported. However, the GI score and board size have the opposite 
sign as to what was expected. 
 Perhaps the most important governance variables analyzed here are the percent of 
inside and outside directors on the board.  With a greater proportion of outsiders, a board 
is more independent and has more effective monitoring power (Fama 1980).  Since the 
hypothesis stated that socially responsible firms should have stronger, more effective 
governance structures than the matched sample, then more outsiders and fewer insiders 
on SR boards would be supportive of this proposition.  As indicated in Table 1.4, the 
difference between the percentages of insiders and outsiders on SR and non-SR boards of 
directors is statistically significant.  Socially responsible firms tend to have boards with 
fewer insiders (23 percent) and more outsiders (71 percent) than the matched sample of 
non-designated socially responsible firms (31 percent and 61 percent respectively).  This 
provides substantial support for the hypothesis that SR firms have stronger boards than 
non-SR firms.  In addition, gray directors are seen as a hindrance to board independence.  
The results show that SR firms are less likely to have gray directors on the board than 
non-SR firms (5 percent and 7 percent respectively). 
 Another indication of board independence and effectiveness as a monitor is the 
level of diversity.  Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2002) find that diversity increases 
board effectiveness, and subsequently increases shareholder value.  The measure for 
board diversity in this study is the percentage of women on the board of directors.  The 
results indicate that socially responsible firms have a significantly larger percentage of 
women on the board (13 percent) than do the boards of non-SR firms (8 percent).   
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 While the majority of CEOs are also the board chairman for both samples, it 
appears that SR firms are less likely than non-SR firms to have CEO/Chair duality (72 
versus 78 percent).  As indicated in Jensen (1993), having separation between the CEO 
and chairman of the board creates independence and increases effectiveness of the board, 
which reduces agency problems between shareholders and managers.   
 As anticipated, socially responsible firms tend to be managed by professional 
managers rather than by founding family members.  CEOs of non-SR firms are almost 
twice as likely to be founding family members as CEOs of SR firms (15 versus 8 percent, 
respectively).  Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2002) find that family-managed firms tend 
to have lower returns on sales and assets than professionally-managed firms, and family 
CEOs are promoted to the post an average of 9 years earlier than professional managers 
(which is likely to be detrimental to firm performance).  Their results suggest that firms 
run by founding family members tend to perform worse than firms managed otherwise.  
Therefore, the agency problem should be reduced in firms where the CEO is not part of 
the founding family. 
 The results for the fraction of busy directors and outside directors who are also 
CEOs of other corporations provide noteworthy insight.  Socially responsible firms have 
more directors who are also directors on three or more other boards (busy) and they have 
more directors who are CEOs than do non-SR firms.  Eighteen percent of SR directors 
are classified as busy, compared to 16 percent of non-SR directors.  CEOs of other firms 
make up 18 percent of the directors on SR boards and 16 percent of non-SR directors.  
The opinions and expertise of these directors may be valuable and sought after by 
numerous firms, and thus become busier than other directors.   
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 In addition, there is a significant difference between the numbers of board 
members on socially responsible versus non-socially responsible boards.  Yermack 
(1996) finds that a more effective board (as measured by Tobins Q) is comprised of a 
smaller number of directors.  Intriguingly, it appears that SR firms have, on average, one 
more director on the board than do the matched firms (10.43 and 9.56, respectively).  
Since the sample of socially responsible firms taken from the Domini Social Index is 
comprised of larger firms, on average, than that of the matched sample, it may be that the 
larger firms demand larger boards.  In addition, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) report 
that small boards may not be optimal for all firms. 
 It is interesting to note that the presence of board members that work with non-
profit organizations is not significantly different between the two samples, especially 
since it is highly correlated with the percentage of women on the board, and SR boards 
have significantly more women than do non-SR boards.  Also, there does not appear to be 
a difference between the percentage of senior board members on SR and non-SR boards.  
But since the age of the CEO on both boards does not differ, this may be an explanation 
since the two variables (proportion of seniors and age) are positively correlated.  In 
addition, the presence of a blockholder on the board is not dependent on firm type.  Since 
the sign on this variable was ambiguous given the prior literature, it may not be related to 
the reduction of agency problems found with other governance structure variables. 
 In the presence of strong board characteristics, takeover defenses can be 
associated less with management entrenchment since shareholders are protected by other 
mechanisms.  Therefore, SR firms can afford to adopt such provisions without hurting 
shareholder wealth.  I document that SR firms have an average GI score of 9.68 while 
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non-SR firms have an average score of 9.10.  Although statistically significant, this result 
does not appear to be economically significant.  The small numerical difference between 
the two samples GI scores represents the fact that, on average, non-SR firms have a 
slightly smaller number of antitakeover amendments than their SR counterparts. 
However, this result implies that caution should be taken when interpreting the 
Governance Index score in the presence of varying board characteristics.   The small 
difference is consistent with the theory that board structure and takeover defense 
mechanisms are substitute methods of effective governance. 
 Taken together, the results of the difference in means tests support the hypothesis 
that socially responsible firms have more effective governance structures in place than 
their non-SR counterparts.  In the next section, a probability model is used to specify the 
exact functional relationship between board characteristics and the likelihood that the 
firm is socially responsible while controlling for firm size.  
 
[insert Table 1.4 about here] 
 
1.4.2 Multivariate Statistics 
1.4.2.1 Logistic Regression 
 I report the results of the logistic regression equation examining board structure 
and firm type in Table 1.5.  The dependent variable, firm type, indicates the probability 
that the firm is a socially responsible company (y = 1 if SR, otherwise, y = 0) where 
prob(y = 1) = π = eXβ / (1 + eXβ). Here, X is the vector of sixteen governance structure 
variables and β is the vector of parameters.  Since there is a binary response variable, 
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maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the unknown parameters (β0, β1 β16) 
to ensure that the estimated response probabilities are strictly between zero and one.  The 
coefficients indicate the signs of the partial effects of each independent variable on the 
response probability (that the firm is socially responsible).   
 
[insert Table 1.5 about here] 
 
The logistic regression results indicate that eight of the sixteen governance 
structure variables are significant in the model.  Many of the results are in agreement with 
the univariate t-tests.   
Model 1 in Table 1.5 shows the logistic regression with all of the governance 
characteristics as independent variables, excluding the percent of outside directors 
(including the proportions of insiders, outsiders, and grays will be problematic in the 
multivariate analysis since these will sum to 1.0).  Here the findings indicate that when 
more females are present on the board, it is significantly more likely that the board is 
from a socially responsible firm.  Also, firms classified as non-SR are more likely to have 
a high percentage of insiders and grays on the board.  In addition, SR boards are more 
likely to have a CEO who is not also the chairman of the board, as indicated by the 
negative coefficient on the duality variable.   
Surprisingly, board members involved with non-profit organizations are more 
likely to represent a firm from the matched sample.  One explanation is that directors 
involved with non-profit organizations may use their directorship as a way to raise capital 
for their organization, leading to collusion with the CEO and other inside directors.  
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Alternatively, this could be an attempt to window dress on the part of the non-SR 
firms.  In addition, boards elected on an annual basis rather than by staggered elections 
are more likely to be the boards of socially responsible firms than of the matched sample.  
The presence of family members on the board of directors indicates that the firm is 
socially responsible.  But for CEOs who are part of the founding family, there is less of a 
chance that these CEOs come from socially responsible firms. 
As a check for robustness, additional variables are added to the model.  As 
mentioned earlier, the socially responsible firms in the sample are larger on average than 
the matched firms.  Since firm size may be a confounding factor in the logistic regression 
analysis, three control variables are included in Model 3: beta, the natural logarithm of 
market value of equity, and the natural log of total assets.  Beta is used to capture any 
risk-induced bias that may confound the results.  Market value and total assets are proxies 
for size.  Model 1 shows that the addition of these variables has little effect on the 
significant predictors of SR firms.  The log of firm market value is positive and 
significant in the model, which is consistent with the univariate results in Table 1.2.  
 Model 2 in Table 1.5 includes only those independent variables that were 
significant in the univariate tests to explain differences in SR and non-SR boards.  Here, 
only the proportion of outsiders is used to avoid any multicollinearity issues with the 
logistic regression analysis.  The results are again identical to Model 1, except that the 
founding family variable is no longer significant in the model. 
 In Model 3 of Table 1.5, I include the Governance Index (GI) variable in the 
logistic regressions.  Since sample size is reduced when using the GI score (325 SR firms 
and 210 non-SR firms), I do not include it in the previous models.  The results of this 
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regression are consistent with the prior results.  CEO/Chair duality, election terms, non-
profit affiliation, proportion of outsiders and proportion of women on the board are 
significant in the model.  In addition, the GI score is positive and significant, indicating 
that SR firms are have higher GI scores than non-SR firms, which is consistent with 
results from univariate tests reported in Table 1.4.  I next run regressions using the 
control variables and the significant variables from Model 4 (results not reported).  Doing 
so does not change the results.  The positive coefficient on GI is counter to the 
hypotheses that firms with stronger corporate governance should have a lower GI score.  
However, since SR firms have strong boards in place (one mechanism of corporate 
governance), they can afford to have more antitakeover charter provisions than firms 
without such a structure.  This result is consistent with univariate results. 
 
1.4.2.2 Director Compensation 
 Next, I test the sensitivity of director compensation to economic determinants and 
board structure variables.  Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1998) use executive 
compensation to proxy for board effectiveness. CEO compensation levels include total 
compensation (cash, stock, and options) and salary (cash) compensation.  Their 
hypothesis is that compensation levels should only be related to economic determinants, 
such as return on assets and stock return, and any board structure variables found to be 
significantly related to executive compensation are deemed ineffective.  For instance, 
they find that a lower proportion of outsiders on the board is directly related to 
compensation levels even after controlling for economic determinants, thus supporting 
the idea that more outsiders on the board are preferred to less.  Using director 
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compensation as the dependent variable may distort this hypothesis.  In terms of director 
compensation, an alternative view is that board structure, if effective, should influence 
director compensation.  Since director compensation differs from executive compensation 
in that economic determinants may be less influential to overall levels, director pay may 
be more sensitive to board structure.  In addition, Brick, Palmon and Ward (2002) find 
that director compensation is positively related to variables that proxy for the degree of 
monitoring required.  In this respect, since SR firms may have lower agency costs than 
non-SR firms, variables that increase the need for monitoring should be related to 
compensation, but this relationship should be weaker for SR firms.  Therefore, board 
characteristics that reduce board effectiveness should be positively related to director 
compensation, and this relationship should be stronger for the non-SR firm sample. 
 To test this sensitivity, I regress the annual retainer (cash compensation) granted 
to directors on economic determinants of compensation and board structure variables. 
Annual retainer is higher for SR firm directors than non-SR firms (t-statistic equals -2.78, 
significant at the 1 percent level, not reported).   As reported in Table 1.6, sales is 
positively related to annual retainer for both samples, and is more significant for the non-
SR firms.  This is consistent with the hypothesis since bigger firms require more 
monitoring on the part of directors, and non-SR directors receive a larger increase in cash 
compensation than SR directors for the same increase in monitoring difficulty. Return on 
assets is positively related to annual retainer for the SR firms only, but the difference in 
coefficients between SR and non-SR firms is not significant.  The size of the board is 
positively related to the amount of director cash compensation for both samples, 
however, there is a stronger relationship between board size and compensation for the SR 
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firms than the non-SR firms.  This is not consistent with the hypothesis, but it supports 
earlier results that suggest that larger boards are more effective for this particular sample 
than smaller boards. Founding family CEOs should increase the need for monitoring by 
directors, yet the presence of a family CEO actually reduces the annual retainer for the 
SR firms and has no effect on non-SR directors compensation.  Overall, economic 
determinants are more significant in explaining variations in director compensation than 
are board structure variables.  Since non-SR firms have greater monitoring needs than SR 
firms in similar industries, they should have stronger relationships between ineffective 
board characteristics and director compensation, and in some instances, this hypothesis is 
supported. 
 
[insert Table 1.6 about here] 
 
1.4.2.3 Continuous Measure of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Identical independent variables are used in Table 1.7 as in the logistic regression 
from Table 1.5.  This time, multiple regression is used to analyze the effects of board 
characteristics on the KLD Socrates Database score.  A higher score indicates a higher 
degree of corporate social responsibility.  Three separate regressions are run for the full 
sample, socially responsible firms, and matched firms, respectively. 
As reported in Table 1.7, several board characteristics for the full sample 
significantly explain variation in the KLD score.  The number of board members is 
directly related to the social responsibility score, which supports the original hypothesis 
according to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and results found in the univariate tests in 
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Table 1.4.  Also, when boards are elected on a staggered basis, the KLD score decreases.  
This supports the initial hypothesis that boards elected annually should be linked with 
stronger board structures and subsequently with SR firms boards.  The proportions of 
outsiders and women on the board are directly related to the KLD score, which also 
corroborates initial hypotheses.  Control variables include log of market value, beta, and 
log of total assets.7  Total assets, interestingly, is negatively related to the KLD score.  
This informally supports the idea that size is not an overall determinant of whether or not 
the firm is from the SR sample. This issue will be addressed further in the next section. 
Next, regressions are run using the SR and non-SR samples.  Interestingly, the 
matched firm regressions show no statistically significant relationships between board 
characteristics and the KLD score.  Regressions for the SR sample show some significant 
characteristics, including proportion of outsiders and women on the board, which are 
positively related to the KLD score.   However, differences between coefficients from the 
SR and non-SR samples are not statistically significant (except in the case of the 
proportion of outsiders on the board, where the difference is significant at the 10 percent 
level).   
I also include the Governance Index score as an independent variable in the 
regression (results not reported).  Using all the firms in the sample with GI scores, results 
are consistent with prior models.  Board size and proportion of women on the board are 
positively significant at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  The coefficient 
                                                
7 In the event that total assets and market value are correlated, I also run the regressions omitting market 
value from the set of independent variables.  Results are consistent with those reported in Table 7, although 
the p-value for the coefficient on the proportion of outsiders variable using the full sample increases to 
0.101 making this variable only marginally significant. 
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on GI is not significant, however.  This indicates that the Governance Index score is not 
related to the KLD score after controlling for board and size factors. 
 
[insert Table 1.7 about here] 
 
1.4.3 Robustness Checks 
1.4.3.1 Reduced Samples 
To further analyze the univariate results, I repeat the paired t-tests from Table 1.4 
using samples that are split between the above-median and below-median values for 
board size, proportion of insiders, proportion of outsiders, proportion of busy directors, 
proportion of CEOs on the board, and proportion of women on the board.  I evaluate 
these variables and their influence on the other board structure variables further since 
they are found to be significantly different between SR and non-SR firms in the original 
tests.  This process will help to identify the most important structural differences between 
SR and non-SR boards by controlling for differences in certain governance structure 
variables.   
For both high and low values for each structural variable, there continues to 
be a statistically significant relationship for both the proportion of outsiders and 
proportion of women on the board.  Board size is significantly different in all models 
except when using samples divided on above-median proportion of insiders and above-
median proportion of women on the board.  Duality, founding family CEO, proportion of 
insiders, and proportion of grays are also significantly different between the two samples 
for most of the subdivided firms. Additionally, process of director elections, proportion 
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of senior directors and proportion of busy directors are significantly different in several 
samples, but not the majority of the reduced samples.   In conclusion, the univariate 
differences between SR and non-SR boards are robust to sample revisions based on high 
and low values of certain board characteristics.  Particularly, the proportion of outsiders 
and women on the board, board size, duality, founding family CEOs, proportion of 
insiders and proportion of grays are significantly different between SR and non-SR 
boards even after controlling for differences in specific board characteristics.   
As mentioned earlier, one criticism of using the Domini Social Index as the 
sample of socially responsible firms in this study is that proxy voting guidelines screen 
for good governance characteristics.  In order to affirm that these results are not simply 
due to a sample bias, I reduce the sample to those Domini Social Index firms that are 
cross-listed on the Calvert Social Index, which is another broad-based SR mutual fund 
that does not list governance characteristics in proxy voting guidelines.  This leaves 181 
SR firms and 181 matched firms.  The first column of Table 1.8 shows the paired t-test 
results between these reduced samples.  The Calvert SR firms exhibit similar board 
characteristics as the Domini SR firms indicating that these boards are more independent 
than the matched sample boards.  Specifically, these firms have more outside directors 
(and subsequently less insiders and grays), more women on the board, less instances that 
the CEO is also the chairman of the board, more frequent use of annual elections of 
directors, and more CEOs on the board than the matched sample.  Differences from the 
Domini sample include that meetings and proportion of senior directors have different 
signs (but in both tests, t-values are not significant), and that proportion of busy directors 
is no longer significant in the model. However, the strongest board characteristics that 
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lead to independent and strong boards of directors are identical in both SR samples, 
therefore eliminating the possibility of a sample bias. This supports the previous 
verification of the univariate tests, which showed that certain board characteristic 
differences between the two samples are robust to reducing the sample by separating 
between small and large values of significant characteristics from Table 1.4.  Particularly, 
the proportion of outsiders and women on the board, board size, duality, founding family 
CEOs, proportion of insiders and proportion of grays are significantly different between 
SR and non-SR boards, which confirm the results in Table 1.8. 
 In addition, to affirm that the results are based on a socially responsible effect 
rather than a size effect, I reduce the sample to include only those SR firms whose 
matched firms are within at least 20 percent of the market value of the DSI firm.  This 
generates a sample size of 101 SR firms and 101 matched firms.  The univariate results 
using this sample are similar to those reported in Table 1.4 and are shown in the second 
column of Table 1.8.  Again, the SR firms have more outsiders, less insiders, more 
women, lower instance of the CEO being from the founding family, and a greater 
instance of the CEO not also holding the position of chairman of the board.  Less 
influential characteristics differ somewhat with the full sample: the number of board 
members and the proportion of gray directors are not significant, and the director election 
process (terms) is not significant in the model (although this was only marginally 
significant in the full sample).  These results again support the univariate statistics 
robustness checks. 
I also test for differences in the Governance Index score with the reduced 
samples.  This reduces the samples further, and results are not reported in the table.  The 
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paired difference t-tests between GI scores for SR and non-SR firms using both the 
Calvert cross-listed reduced sample and the size difference restriction sample are 
consistent with Table 1.4.  Both are significantly different at the 5 percent level.   
 
[insert Table 1.8 about here] 
 
In summary of the reduced sample tests, board characteristics that are the 
strongest indicators of board strength and independence are consistently significant in the 
SR sample, while some of the more ambiguous board strength characteristics (such as 
proportion of busy and gray directors) may differ when using different samples.  This 
result gives further insight as to the central characteristics of an effective board of 
directors. 
 
1.4.3.2 Size controls 
To further control for endogenous size effects, cross-sectional regressions are 
considered.  Denis and Sarin (1999) control for firm size in their analysis of equity 
ownership and board characteristics by regressing the percent of independent outsiders on 
the natural logarithm of equity market value and various board characteristics.  Prior 
literature shows that the composition of outside directors on the board is a strong 
indication of board independence and effectiveness.  When the percentage of outside 
directors is used as the dependent variable in a regression, the relative importance of firm 
size and type in determining board independence and their influence on previous results 
can be gauged statistically. Table 1.9 shows the results of three regressions where the 
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dependent variable is the percentage of outsiders on the board.  Independent variables 
include the log of equity market value, firm type (SR or non-SR) and all governance 
variables (Model 1), only the significant variables from the univariate t-tests (Model 2), 
and only the significant variables in the logistic regression (Model 3). Even after 
controlling for board size, results are consistent with previous findings.  Socially 
responsible firms are likely to have more outsiders on the board, since firm type is 
positive and significant in each model.  Firms where directors are elected on a staggered 
basis rather than annually appointed are associated with greater board independence.  The 
proportion of insiders and gray directors, clearly, is negatively related to the proportion of 
outsiders on the board.  The proportion of busy directors and directors who are also CEOs 
of other companies are also positively related to board independence.  The proportion of 
women on the board is consistently related to outside representation on the board. 
In Model 4, I report the coefficients for the regression model using the variables 
in Model 2 plus the Governance Index score.  A similar pattern emerges where board 
characteristics are consistent with results in Model 2.  The Governance Index score, 
however, is not significant in the model.  This is an interesting result since the GI is 
supposed to be measuring board effectiveness, and a commonly used measure of board 
effectiveness is proportion of outsiders on the board.  Here, after controlling for other 
board structure variables and size, this index is not significantly related to the percent of 
independent directors on the board.   Overall, the regressions in Table 1.9 show that after 
controlling for firm size, board characteristics labeled as promoting independence are 
maintained. 
[insert Table 1.9 about here] 
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1.5 Conclusion  
 The crisis in corporate governance has created a sense of distrust amongst 
investors in the United States.  In growing numbers, investors are considering more than 
the firms financial data when buying stock.  A companys commitment to social 
responsibility is becoming an important issue in terms of investment and performance.  
The board of directors, acting as the managers monitor for the shareholders, should also 
be aware of the influence that the managers decisions have on employees, the supply 
chain, the community, and the environment.  A company that is considered socially 
responsible should have a governance structure that is aligned with these interests.  An 
independent and effective board will reduce agency problems between managers and 
shareholders since shareholders and other stakeholders trust the board to monitor 
management.   
This study has extended the definition of corporate governance to include firm 
responsibility to stakeholders.  The objective is to identify key characteristics that make 
socially responsible firms boards of directors stronger than their non-designated SR 
competition.  The difference in characteristics can be attributed to the reduction of agency 
problems in socially responsible firms since these boards better align interests of 
managers and shareholders since they are concerned about stakeholder needs.  Since the 
focus of corporate governance is shifting from protecting only shareholder to protecting 
all stakeholders, SR firms should have strong governance structures in place.  Results 
support the hypothesis that socially responsible firms have more effective boards of 
directors than their non-SR counterparts.   
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An important indication of board of directors independence and effectiveness is 
the composition of the board.  The results of this study confirm the hypothesis that SR 
firms have stronger boards than non-SR firms.   Socially responsible boards have a 
significantly higher percentage of outside directors than the matched sample.  Likewise, 
non-SR firms have more insiders and more gray directors on the board than SR firms. 
There are typically more women on SR boards, indicating that SR boards are 
more diverse than non-SR boards.  Directors on SR boards tend to be busier, in that they 
are on other boards and are often CEOs of other firms, but have fewer meetings than non-
SR directors.   SR boards have more directors on average than non-SR boards. This result 
is later supported in further tests using a continuous measure of social responsibility.  The 
CEO, who is almost always on the board of directors despite current controversy on the 
topic, is less likely to be from the founding family on an SR board, and are less likely to 
have the firms CEO as their chairman. 
The probability that a firm is socially responsible is increased when there are 
more outsiders, older directors, and more women on the board.  In addition, when the 
directors are elected on a staggered basis, there is a greater probability that the firm is 
non-socially responsible.   
When monitoring needs are increased, directors should receive higher 
compensation to counterbalance their increased duties.  This relationship should be more 
pronounced for firms with larger monitoring requirements (non-SR firms) due to 
increased agency problems.  I test this relationship by analyzing the sensitivity of 
directors annual cash compensation on economic and board characteristics, and find that 
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non-SR directors receive higher increases in compensation for increases in some proxies 
of monitoring requirements than do SR firms, thus supporting the hypothesis. 
Robustness checks show that the strongest board characteristics are consistent in 
various SR samples.  These characteristics include a larger proportion of outsiders on the 
board, a smaller proportion of insiders, more women on the board (indicating board 
diversity), and a lower probability that the CEO is also the chairman of the board of 
directors.  This result adds to the understanding of the major board characteristics that 
lead to board independence and strength. 
Implications of the finding that socially responsible firms have stronger 
governance structures than their competitors are relevant to both academics and 
practitioners.  These results add to the growing body of empirical literature on corporate 
governance, lending support to the theory that the quality of the board of directors 
depends on how well they alleviate agency problems between managers and 
shareholders.  Characteristics related to board independence create effective governance 
structures.  In addition, social responsibility, a popular term in the financial press and 
investment circles, has yet to be considered substantially in financial research.  This study 
fills a research gap by incorporating the concept of social responsibility into the corporate 
governance literature.  The goal of corporate governance is changing from that of 
promoting shareholders to that of promoting stakeholders.  This study addresses this shift 
using a unique sample of socially responsible firms, and results support the hypothesis 
that agency and monitoring costs are reduced in an environment promoting the welfare of 
all corporate stakeholders. 
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Chapter 2. Effective Board Monitoring: Evidence from Socially Responsible Firms 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The potential conflict of interest between a firms shareholders and its manager 
has long been of importance to researchers.  Agency costs arise when a managers private 
goals are inconsistent with maximizing shareholder wealth.  The board of directors acts 
on shareholders behalf to monitor managers as a market solution to the agency problem.  
Specifically, Fama and Jensen (1983) advocate that the role of the board is to resolve 
agency problems through responsibilities such as determining compensation and 
replacing those managers who are not creating firm value for shareholders.  Executive 
compensation contracts can provide proper incentives for managers by linking salary 
revisions, bonuses, and option grants to the firms stock price performance.  In addition, 
executives can face dismissal if their actions result in the reduction of shareholder wealth. 
Since executive compensation and CEO dismissal decisions are set by the corporations 
board of directors, CEO pay and CEO turnover may be viewed as elements of a broader 
corporate governance system. 
Recent accounting scandals and allegations of excessive CEO pay at several 
prominent firms such as Tyco and Enron have increased shareholder awareness of the 
importance of an effective corporate governance system.  Investors have begun to 
question the integrity of financial statements and the design of executive compensation.  
Shareholders appear to be searching for firms they believe to be trustworthy, and firms 
labeled as socially responsible have attracted their attention.  The Social Investment 
Forum, a nonprofit organization, reported that socially and environmentally responsible 
mutual funds experienced positive asset growth in the first half of 2002, while U.S. 
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diversified fund assets decreased substantially. Using data from Lipper, they show that 
socially responsible mutual funds increased their assets by 3 percent between January and 
June 2002, while the U.S. diversified funds experienced a 9.5 percent decrease in total 
assets.8  
An objective of social responsibility is a focus on a broad range of corporate 
stakeholders.  Indeed, John and Senbet (1998) suggest that firms with managers who are 
conscious of their influence on all stakeholders should benefit from better alignment of 
manager and shareholder interests, and thus experience lower agency costs.  Tirole 
(2001) introduces the concept of the stakeholder society and suggests that a broader 
focus on all stakeholders results in better managerial decisions than does a narrower 
focus on shareholder wealth.  However, the link between social responsibility and 
corporate governance is ultimately an empirical question, and one that has not been 
addressed by existing research. 
In this paper, I examine the actions of the board of directors in socially 
responsible firms.  Specifically, I compare the structure of executive compensation and 
CEO turnover at firms deemed to be socially responsible (SR) to a matched sample of 
firms without such a designation (non-SR).  Webb (2003) shows that SR boards have 
characteristics traditionally regarded as being stronger and more objective, and thus are 
better able to monitor management effectively.  However, she does not examine specific 
actions that these boards take.  This paper provides additional insights on the monitoring 
effectiveness of boards of directors by examining how their actions differ between SR 
and non-SR firms in response to managerial performance. 
                                                
8 See http://www.socialinvest.org. 
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I find that CEOs at SR firms are paid higher salaries, and this result is driven by 
small firms in the sample.  This may suggest that SR firms are willing to pay more to 
attract a better quality CEO.  Also, the results may imply that CEOs at SR firms are not 
willing to sacrifice higher wages for the rewards of working at a SR firm, or that SR 
boards measure performance by something other than traditional accounting measures of 
performance.  In addition, I find that the types of compensation differ between SR and 
non-SR firms, with SR firms placing less emphasis on perquisites and bonus than non-SR 
firms.  SR firms also use more restricted stock grants than non-SR firms, but the 
proportion of equity compensation between both types of firms are similar. 
Although CEOs at SR firms receive a higher base salary than non-SR CEOs, 
changes in salary for a fixed change in stock performance is relatively small.  Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) suggest that linking executive compensation to firm performance is a way 
for the board of directors to reduce agency problems by rewarding managers for acting in 
the best interest of the shareholders. If socially responsible firms have stronger boards in 
place, these boards should design more effective compensation packages.  This may 
suggest SR firms boards should design CEO contracts with greater pay-for-performance 
sensitivity.  However, SR firms are generally believed to have better employee practices 
and lower agency costs, implying that greater pay-for-performance sensitivity may not be 
needed.  Empirical results support this latter conjecture, as I find lower pay-performance 
sensitivity at SR firms.   
Just as boards reward managers for strong performance, another monitoring 
function involves enforcing penalties for poor performance.  One way to do this is to 
replace the CEO after poor market performance.  Consistent with effective board 
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monitoring, I find that after controlling for CEO age, SR firms are more likely to 
experience CEO turnover subsequent to poor performance. 
When monitoring needs and agency costs are high, instances of managerial risk 
taking increase.  I find that stock options at SR firms are not related to stock return 
volatility, while a significant relationship exists for non-SR firms.  This implies that non-
SR firms require additional monitoring that appears to be already effective at SR firms. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of employee 
practices and agency costs at socially responsible firms.  Section 3 outlines the 
hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the data.  Section 5 provides results and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2.2 Agency Costs and Employee Practices at Socially Responsible Firms 
 
While executive compensation and corporate governance have been the subject of 
extensive prior research in finance, relatively little emphasis has been placed on 
examining how governance structures differ at firms facing varying levels of agency 
costs.9  However, firms deemed to be socially responsible provide a unique environment 
for analysis of such issues, since their agency costs should be lower.  John and Senbet 
(1998) suggest that managers who are conscious of the firms influence on stakeholders 
will have decreased the agency problem between outsiders and insiders, or shareholders 
and management, since their respective interests become more aligned.  Tirole (2001) 
                                                
9 A notable exception is the examination of compensation at regulated firms such as banks, utilities, and 
airlines.  For regulated firms, executive decision-making may be more transparent and opportunities to 
invest in projects severely limited (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992).  Consistent with such 
firms having lower agency costs and less need for monitoring, Houston and James (1995) find that bank 
CEOs are paid less equity-based compensation than non-bank CEOs.  Similarly, Crawford, Ezzell and 
Miles (1995) and Hubbard and Palia (1995) find a stronger link between CEO pay and firm performance 
for banks following deregulation events.   
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suggests that a broad focus on corporate stakeholders in addition to shareholders will 
result in better decision-making by managers. 
Milton Friedman first defined corporate social responsibility in 1970.  He stated 
that corporate social responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with 
shareholders desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while 
conforming to the basic rules of society, both those embodied in law and those embodied 
in ethical custom.  More recently, Carroll (1991) uses a broader definition of corporate 
social responsibility, arguing that it refers to a business entitys attention to and 
fulfillment of responsibilities to multiple stakeholders which exist at various levels: 
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic.  Thus, socially responsible firms are 
expected to be more aware of their responsibilities to various stakeholders, and these 
firms should benefit from reduced agency costs. 
Consistent with a reduction of agency costs, studies find a positive relationship 
between corporate social responsibility and financial performance.  For example, 
Waddock and Graves (1997) find a link between profitability and corporate social 
responsibility.  They acknowledge that causality may go in both directions: firms with 
strong financial performance may have excess resources that can be spent on corporate 
social responsibility measures, or it may be the case that socially responsible firms have 
better managerial practices, which may lead to better financial performance.  Hillman and 
Keim (2001) find similar results using shareholder value creation (market value added) as 
the performance measure.  In an earlier study, McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis 
(1988) find a positive relationship between SR and financial performance.  In this study, 
the authors use corporate reputation ratings from Fortune magazine as a social 
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responsibility metric.  Using both prior- and post-performance measures, they find that 
prior accounting-based performance measures explain more of the variation in corporate 
reputation ratings than do prior stock returns.  However, prior measures of performance 
(both accounting- and market-based) are more closely related to corporate reputation 
ratings than post measures of performance. 
Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) develop a theoretical model to explore the 
effect of social investing on stock prices.  They show that exclusionary investing leads to 
shares of non-socially responsible firms being held by few investors.  The lack of risk-
sharing among non-socially responsible investors leads to lower stock prices for non-
socially responsible firms, which results in an increase in their cost of capital.  This could 
potentially lead to greater conflicts between managers and shareholders and higher 
agency costs at non-socially responsible firms.  Statman (2000) shows that the Domini 
Social Index, an index of socially responsible firms, performed as well as the S&P 500 
over the 1990  1998 period.  Also, Webb (2003) shows that the board structure of SR 
firms is consistent with characteristics of stronger boards, which have been shown to 
alleviate agency problems. 
In addition to lower agency costs, SR firms may have better employee practices.10  
For example, Waddock and Graves (1997) highlight the importance of employee policies 
at SR firms.  These policies tend to have low costs, but may substantially increase the 
motivation and the loyalty of the employees, leading to greater productivity.  Likewise, 
Turban and Greening (1997) find that socially responsible firms are perceived as being 
more attractive to employees.  Their findings are consistent with the model of Stigler 
                                                
10 Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. screens companies on particular social indicators, including employee 
relations, to evaluate overall social responsibility.  See section 4 for further details. 
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(1962), who argues that companies that consider employee welfare are able to attract 
better applicants.  Albinger and Freeman (2000) extend these studies and show that 
corporate social performance is positively related to the attractiveness of the employer for 
job applicants with high levels of job choice but unrelated for applicants with low levels 
of job choice.  This suggests that socially responsible firms may be better positioned to 
attract the most qualified employees.  Given that employees are an important stakeholder 
and that SR firms are concerned for all stakeholders, SR firms appear to have better 
employee practices.   
   
2.3 Hypotheses 
 
 The overriding hypothesis throughout this paper is that socially responsible firms 
boards of directors are more effective monitors than non-SR boards.  I look at this issue 
from a variety of perspectives, including compensation structure, pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, CEO turnover, and risk taking. 
 
2.3.1 Compensation Structure  
The level and structure of executive compensation is set by a firms board of 
directors.  Webb (2003) shows that SR firms have characteristics which are consistent 
with more effective boards of directors.  If board members of SR firms are more likely to 
monitor management closely, then they may be expected to establish more effective 
compensation contracts.  
Albinger and Freeman (2000) find that socially responsible firms can attract more 
highly-skilled employees than can non-SR firms.  To retain these quality employees, SR 
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executives may receive higher levels of compensation than executives of non-SR firms.  
However, given that SR firms may have better employee practices, executives may be 
willing to accept less in other forms of compensation to for work for a company that 
values employees. 
In addition to overall compensation levels differing, it is possible that SR firms 
and non-SR firms rely on different types of compensation.  For example, SR firms may 
be less likely to grant very large cash bonuses and perks, or may be more likely to 
encourage stock ownership through restricted stock grants than non-SR firms.  However, 
these issues are largely empirical questions. 
 
2.3.2 Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity 
Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that with financing constraints and risk aversion, 
it may be optimal to use a combination of monitoring and incentive contracts.  They 
contend that incentive contracts can be designed to induce managers to make correct 
decisions.  Morgan and Poulsen (2001) suggest that an "internal solution to the problem 
of inefficient or self-serving management is the development of compensation plans that 
tie managerial compensation directly to corporate performance, especially through stock-
price performance."  
While Jensen and Murphy (1990) find evidence that the pay-performance 
sensitivity of CEO compensation is low, a more recent study by Hall and Liebman (1998) 
finds a strong relationship between firm performance and executive compensation.  Hall 
and Liebman (1998) suggest that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity 
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of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because 
of increases in stock option grants. 
Given the link between incentive alignment and pay-for-performance sensitivity, 
it is possible to argue that more effective boards should utilize greater pay-for-
performance sensitivity.  However, an effective board should also be able to recognize 
when greater pay-for-performance sensitivity is needed.  For example, in the presence of 
substantial agency problems or conflicts, an effective board should design a 
compensation package with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity.  In the case of SR 
firms, if agency costs are lower, there may be less of a need for pay-for-performance 
sensitivity than firms with higher agency costs.  Also, SR firms may measure 
performance by something other than stock returns, which would reduce the sensitivity of 
compensation to stock performance. 
In addition, Tirole (2001) states that managerial incentives should be designed to 
promote all stakeholders rather than a narrow focus on shareholders.  Since there is no 
accepted accounting measure of stakeholder welfare, this task becomes difficult.  
Therefore, the author deduces that stakeholder society is best endorsed through flat 
managerial compensation, which would result in little pay-for-performance sensitivity.  
Furthermore, such compensation may not be required at SR firms to attract and retain 
qualified executives.  Such firms provide better overall employee practices, which may 
reduce voluntary turnover and the need for equity-based compensation.  Additionally, if 
boards at SR firms are more effective monitors, there may be less need to link CEO pay 
to performance.  Essentially, board monitoring at such firms may serve as a substitute for 
strong pay-for-performance.  For these reasons, CEOs at SR firms should have less pay-
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for-performance sensitivity.  SR firms therefore present an interesting setting to evaluate 
the effectiveness of boards with respect to pay-for-performance. 
 
2.3.3 Reaction to Performance: CEO Turnover 
According to Jensen and Murphy (1990), the board of directors should reward 
executives for good performance and punish them for poor performance as indicated by 
formal agency models of optimal contracting.  Denis and Denis (1995) note that if 
internal control mechanisms are effective, there should be greater CEO turnover at poorly 
performing firms.  Weisbach (1988) finds that the relation between top management 
replacement and firm performance is strong for firms with a greater proportion of 
independent directors.  In a study on managerial incentives in non-profit hospitals, 
Brickley and Van Horn (2002) find that the board of directors reacts to poor performance 
by replacing CEOs.  They find that even though these firms are non-profit organizations, 
financial performance is an important managerial function, and that performance and 
turnover are inversely related.  Also, Hartzel (2001) documents that in the presence of 
weaker pay-for-performance sensitivity, CEO turnover provides an important monitoring 
function. Thus, I expect a greater incidence of CEO turnover following poor performance 
in SR firms than in non-SR firms, since SR firms should have more effective boards.   
 
2.3.4 Propensity for Risk Taking 
 Just as effective boards should replace managers following poor performance, 
boards should also preclude executives from excessive risk taking that could potentially 
harm the firms stakeholders.  Since risk directly influences the value of executive stock 
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options, some CEOs may increase risk-taking following a large option grant.  Houston 
and James (1995) examine the relationship between equity-based compensation use and 
bank risk taking.  They find that in situations where agency problems are high, more risk 
taking incentives are offered.  Hall and Liebman (1998) report that stock options were the 
fastest growing form of executive compensation from 1980 to 1994.  By that time, 70 
percent of CEOs received stock options compared to only 30 percent in 1980.  This large 
increase could induce CEOs to increase risk to maximize their own portfolio value at the 
expense of firm stakeholders without proper agency controls in place.  However, if SR 
boards are more effective monitors and alleviators of potential conflicts of interest, then 
SR CEOs should not take on more risk following option grants.  
 
2.4 Data 
 
The sample of socially responsible firms used in this study consists of the 400 
firms in the Domini Social Index (as of November 2001).  The Domini Social Index 
(DSI) is a portfolio of ethically screened stocks constructed by the social investment 
research firm of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, & Company.  Firms in this index must pass 
multiple broad-based social screens.  They must have a positive record of shareholder 
activism, community investment, environmental concerns, human rights, employee 
relations, and products and services.  Firms from the alcohol, tobacco, and gambling 
industries, as well as firms involved in weapon and nuclear power production are 
excluded from the index. 
The Domini Social Index is not the only ethically screened portfolio in the 
market.  There are currently more than 199 mutual funds specifically designed for 
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socially responsible investors.  Funds range from aggressive-growth small cap domestic 
equity portfolios (for example, Calvert New Vision Small Cap, and Winslow Green 
Growth Fund) to fixed income funds (Aquinas Fixed Income, and Citizens Income Fund), 
and even international portfolios (such as Enterprise Global Socially Responsive, and 
MMA Praxis International). The Calvert Social Index is also a broad-based social fund 
with 500 companies listed in the portfolio.  This index invests in 46 percent of the firms 
in the Domini Social Index as of January 2001. 
The use of DSI is appropriate as a sample of socially responsible firms as it 
encompasses a wide range of social and environmental screens, thus providing a widely 
accepted sample of firms that are conscientious of stakeholders.  The DSI has been the 
established benchmark for measuring the effects of social screening on investment 
performance since its inception in 1990.  An important advantage for using the DSI over 
other available socially screened portfolios is that a group of independent researchers 
applies the same broad set of criteria to the firms.  The relevant characteristics and 
policies of each firm are gathered from a range of sources, both internal and external to 
the firm. 
I also construct a matched sample of firms that is not designated as socially 
responsible (non-SR firms).  Each firm from the DSI is matched with a non-SR firm 
based on industry and size.  The non-SR firm is selected by locating the firm closest in 
market capitalization (size) to each SR firm within the same three-digit SIC code 
(industry).  Thus, a sample of 400 SR firms and 400 non-SR firms is compiled.  As 
indicated in Table 2.1, the SR firms tend to be larger (in terms of total assets) than the 
matched sample, as many of the firms listed in the DSI are the largest firms in their 
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industry.  Board characteristics (in fiscal year 2001) are collected from proxy statements 
through Nexis-Lexis. 
I obtain executive compensation for the sample of SR firms and the matched 
sample of non-SR firms from Standard & Poors ExecuComp database.  The ExecuComp 
database includes detailed compensation information on the top executives from 1993-
2000 for firms in the S&P 500, the S&P Midcap 400, and the S&P Smallcap 600.  I am 
able to obtain compensation data for 525 firms in the sample.   
I use the following variables from ExecuComp: CEO salary, bonus, other annual 
compensation, restricted stock grants, stock options, long-term incentive plans, and other 
compensation types.  Salary consists of the dollar value of the base salary, while bonus is 
the dollar value of the bonus earned by the CEO during the fiscal year. Other annual 
compensation includes annual compensation that is not categorized as salary or bonus.  It 
includes items such as perquisites and other personal benefits, above-market earnings on 
restricted stock and options, tax reimbursements, and the dollar value of difference 
between the price paid by the CEO for company stock and the actual market price of the 
stock under a stock purchase plan that is not generally available to shareholders or 
employees of the company.  Restricted stock grants represent the value of restricted stock 
granted during the year, whose resale is barred for about three to five years.  If the 
employee terminates his or her employment before the stock vests, they forfeit the 
reward.  Stock options are valued using Black Scholes methodology and represent the 
total value of all options received during the year.  Long term incentive plan (LTIP) 
represents the amount paid out to the CEO under the company's long-term incentive plan. 
These plans measure company performance over a period of more than one year 
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(generally three years).  All other compensation includes the following: Severance 
payments, debt forgiveness, payment for unused vacation, signing bonuses, 401K  
contributions and life insurance premiums. 
    
2.5 Empirical Results 
 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for the sample of SR and non-SR firms.  
Panel A of Table 2.1 shows that the size of SR firms is significantly larger than that of 
non-SR firms.  Given that larger firms are more difficult for dispersed shareholders to 
monitor, this may suggest that SR firms require additional supervision.  However, the two 
samples do not have significantly different levels of performance, leverage, or growth 
opportunities.  Hall and Liebman (1995) state that both size and growth opportunities are 
directly related to compensation levels.   
The samples differ significantly in terms of the structure of their boards as 
reported in Panel B.  The SR firms are less likely to have the CEO also serve as the chair 
of the board of directors.  The non-SR firms have a significantly smaller proportion of 
independent (outside) directors, with a mean for non-SR firms of 65.7 percent compared 
to 71.8 percent for the SR firms.  Independent directors do not have ties to management 
and thus are more likely to serve as monitors.  The SR firms have significantly more 
diverse boards in terms of gender.  Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003) find a positive 
relation between board diversity and firm performance, suggesting that agency costs are 
lower for more diverse boards.  CEO equity ownership also differs significantly between 
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SR and non-SR firms, with non-SR CEOs having higher levels of ownership.  Higher 
managerial ownership is also consistent with lower agency costs.   
 
2.5.2 Compensation Structure 
Table 2.2 reports information on CEO compensation at SR and non-SR firms for 
the period 1993-2000.  As hypothesized, executives at SR firms have higher salaries than 
their non-SR executive counterparts ($750,730 versus $715,340).  This may suggest that 
SR firms attract higher quality employees than do non-SR firms.  Higher quality 
executives may command a higher salary.  Also, CEOs of SR firms do not appear willing 
to forego salary in exchange for working for a SR firm.    While the difference in bonus is 
not statistically significant, SR firms receive less other annual compensation than non-SR 
firms ($37,960 versus $66,570). This implies that while SR CEOs have a higher salary, 
they receive less compensation in the form of perquisites and other personal benefits than 
non-SR firms.  This may be another indication of the effectiveness of SR boards.  An 
interesting result is that SR firms use significantly more restricted stock than non-SR 
firms (p-value equals 0.035).  Typically, with restricted stock, the employee may not sell 
or transfer the shares of stock until they vest (generally a 3-5 year period). Since the stock 
is forfeited if the employee terminates employment before the shares vest, this method of 
compensation has become a popular way to motivate executives and to keep them for a 
length of time.  SR firms appear to use this form of compensation more frequently than 
non-SR firms.  
There is not a significant difference between the use of stock options and long-
term incentive plans by SR and non-SR firms.  However, non-SR firms use other forms 
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of compensation (such as severance payments, debt forgiveness, 401K contributions and 
life insurance premiums) to a greater extent than SR firms.11 There is not a significant 
difference overall in cash compensation (sum of salary plus bonus). The difference 
between the total compensation levels of SR and non-SR CEOs is not statistically 
significant, although the average total compensation is higher for SR firms than that of 
non-SR firms. The proportion of equity-based compensation is slightly higher in SR 
firms (41.12%) compared to non-SR firms (40.91%), but this difference is not 
statistically significant.   
Additional information regarding the compensation structure of the two samples 
is found by separating SR and non-SR firms according to size.  I divide the full sample 
into large (total assets greater than the median) and small (total assets less than the 
median) firms.  I report the results of the reduced sample summary statistics in Table 2.3.  
Panel A of Table 2.3 compares large SR and non-SR firms.  Differences in salary are no 
longer significant (although, large SR firms, on average, had higher compensation levels 
than non-SR firms). In fact, the only significant difference between the two samples is 
with the other annual compensation metric, which values perquisites and other personal 
benefits.  Since this form of compensation mainly consists of perks, such as cars and 
jets, office furnishings, and homes, the use of perquisites has lately been met with 
dissatisfaction from stockholders.  For instance, the perk package of Jack Welch, retired 
chairman and chief executive of General Electric, came under fire in September 2002 
after shareholders found out about the fresh flower service, New York Knicks tickets, 
laundry service and other privileges granted to him on his retirement.  The outcries by 
                                                
11 This type of compensation is different from other annual compensation, which consists mainly of 
perquisites and other personal benefits to the executive. 
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investors prompted the company to later revoke some of Mr. Welch's privileges. At 
Honeywell International, CEO David Cote recently came under fire when shareholders 
found out about that the company paid $61,474 for personal use of the company jet, 
$28,944 for personal use of a company chauffeured car, as well as private security 
services and financial planning. Although the actual value of these objects and benefits 
are generally lower than actual salary and stock option values, it is stories such as these 
that tend to create dissidence between stakeholders of the firm and executives. Large SR 
firms use less of this so-called perquisite compensation, suggesting that their boards 
consider stakeholders interests and effectively monitor managers. 
In Panel B of Table 2.3, I report the summary compensation statistics for small 
firms.  Small SR firms receive larger salaries, but smaller bonuses than non-SR firms.  
Again, since compensation in the form of salary tends to attract less attention from 
stakeholders than bonuses and perks, it appears that the actions of SR boards are more in 
line with stakeholder interests.  Small non-SR CEOs receive more compensation in the 
form of stock options than do small SR firms CEOs ($1,583,700 versus $1,099,400).  
Overall, small non-SR CEOs command higher total compensation than SR firms. 
In general, results from analyzing the compensation structure between the two 
samples suggest that SR firms compensate executives with greater levels of cash 
compensation (in form of annual salary), but they use less in the form of perks and 
bonuses than do non-SR firms.  However, there does not appear to be any statistical 
significance between the proportion of equity-based compensation for SR and non-SR 
firms.  A possible explanation for this is that SR boards recognize that managers of SR 
firms act with the best interest of stakeholders, including shareholders, in mind, so that 
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equity-based compensation becomes a redundant means of alleviating the agency 
problem.  Alternatively, SR boards may choose to measure performance by something 
other than stock returns.   
 
2.5.3 Analysis of the Pay-Performance Relationship 
I next examine the relationship between firm performance and CEO pay using the 
regression approach of Jensen and Murphy (1990).  I estimate the following regression 
separately for the SR firms and the matched sample: 
 
(∆ compensation)t = a + b (∆ shareholder wealth) t + c (∆ shareholder wealth) t-1 
 
where the change in shareholder wealth in year t is defined as the firms stock return 
during year t multiplied by the market value of equity at the beginning of year t.  Four 
different compensation measures are used: salary, bonus, cash compensation (defined as 
salary plus bonus), and total compensation, which includes cash compensation and 
equity-based compensation (stock options, long-term incentive plans, and restricted stock 
grants).  If SR firms have better boards, then a stronger pay-for-performance sensitivity 
may exist.  Alternatively, a better board does not always indicate greater sensitivity 
between compensation and performance.  Instead, an effective board is able to recognize 
when this is needed.  In the case of SR firms, pay-for-performance sensitivity may not be 
necessary in light of their employee practices and lower agency costs. 
Table 2.4 presents the results of the pay-performance analysis.  For the regression 
with salary as the dependent variable, the intercept indicates that a CEO of an SR firm 
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receives an average pay increase of $22,576 when shareholders earn a zero return in each 
of the current and previous years.  The lack of significance of the coefficients on current 
and lagged changes in shareholder wealth indicates no relation between salary and firm 
performance.  Similar results are found for the matched firms  the average pay increase 
is $25,589, and changes in salary are unrelated to changes in shareholder wealth.  As one 
might expect, results for the CEOs bonus are more significant than those found for 
salary.  The CEO of an SR firm receives an average bonus increase of $55,121 when 
shareholders earn a zero return, and a statistically significant but economically negligible 
bonus increase of 0.17 cents (determined by summing the coefficients on current and 
lagged changes in shareholder wealth) for each $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth.  
For non-SR firms, the average bonus increase is $66,409 in the presence of zero returns, 
and bonuses increase by 0.90 cents for each $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth.  The 
difference between the SR and non-SR coefficients for the contemporaneous change in 
shareholder wealth is statistically significant at the 1 percent level (see Panel C of Table 
2.3).  The sum of salary and bonus indicates that CEOs of SR firms tend to receive lower 
cash raises ($77,697) than CEOs of non-SR firms ($91,998) when returns are zero, and 
they also exhibit lower cash pay-performance sensitivity.  This difference is significant at 
the 5 percent level. 
The last column of Table 2.4 reports results of the analysis of the relationship 
between performance and total compensation, which is defined as the sum of salary, 
bonus, grants of options and restricted stock, and other equity-based compensation.  The 
total compensation of CEOs of SR firms increases by $495,911 when shareholder wealth 
is unchanged.  A significantly positive relationship exists between the change in total pay 
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and lagged changes in shareholder wealth, but the magnitude of the change is small  
CEO wealth increases by only 2.3 cents for each $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth.  
For non-SR firms, CEO total compensation increases by $325,337 when the firm earns a 
zero return in the two most recent years.  In addition, CEOs of these firms realize a 
significant relationship between changes in total pay and current year performance, and 
the pay-performance sensitivity is stronger than for SR firms  their total pay increases 
by 19 cents for each $1,000 increase in shareholder wealth.  This difference in 
coefficients between the two samples is significant at the 1 percent level.  Furthermore, 
the increase in total pay for CEOs of non-SR firms is considerably higher than the 3.3 
cents found by Jensen and Murphy (1990) and provides support for Hall and Liebman 
(1998), who find a strong pay-performance sensitivity generated by equity-based 
compensation.  
To analyze pay-for-performances sensitivities between socially responsible and 
non-SR firms while controlling for firm size, I split the sample into firms with above-
median total assets and those firms with below-median assets.  I rerun the regressions 
using these reduced samples.  For the large firms (firms with above-median total assets), 
there is no change in the significance of the coefficients for changes in shareholder 
wealth when the dependent variable equals changes in salary and bonus.  When the 
dependent variable equals the change in total compensation, the difference between the 
SR and non-SR coefficients for change in shareholder wealth is reduced yet is significant 
at the 10 percent level.  Additionally, when using the small firms (firms with below-
median total assets), pay-for-performance sensitivities continue to be lower for the SR 
sample than for the non-SR firms.   
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The results support the hypothesis that the executives at SR firms have lower pay-
for-performance sensitivity than non-SR firm executives, possibly because SR boards of 
directors recognize that this may be a redundant means of motivating their chief 
executive.  The lower pay-performance sensitivity of SR firms may also reflect a 
tendency for these firms to direct financial resources toward socially responsible 
endeavors following good performance, as opposed to increasing executive 
compensation.  This redirection might not necessarily affect the CEO in a negative 
manner, if she derives utility from her contribution to the firms social responsibility.  In 
addition, this result can also imply that SR boards measure performance by something 
other than stock returns, thus producing a low pay-for-performance sensitivity when 
performance is measured by changes in shareholder wealth.  This result also supports the 
idea that todays effective managerial incentives should include rewards for advances in 
the welfare of all stakeholders, not simply shareholder wealth.  Since a measure for 
stakeholder welfare has yet to be established, flat compensation structures should be 
utilized by effective boards.  As suggested by Tirole (2001), a flat compensation structure 
may be effective in promoting stakeholder welfare. 
 
2.5.4 Analysis of CEO Turnover 
The analysis above examined board responses to changes in shareholder wealth 
by means of compensation.  In addition to revisions in compensation, CEOs may be 
motivated by other factors, including the possibility that they will be fired due to poor 
performance.  The penalty for poor performance may differ for SR and non-SR firms.  
Since the boards of directors at SR firms possess characteristics consistent with effective 
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governance structures, it is more likely that they respond to poor performance by 
replacing the CEO than non-SR boards. 
I compare CEO turnover and its determinants for SR firms and non-SR firms by 
estimating the following logistic regression separately for the two groups: 
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The dependent variable in the logistic regression equals one if the CEO is serving in her 
last full fiscal year and zero otherwise.12  The independent variables are the 
contemporaneous and lagged difference between the return on firm i in fiscal year t and 
the return on the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio in the same period. 
For the overall sample, turnover is slightly higher (12.0 percent) for the SR firms 
than for non-SR firms (7.7 percent), which is consistent with closer monitoring by 
directors of SR firms.  Results of the logistic regression analysis of the relation between 
turnover and performance are presented in Table 2.5.  For all SR firms, turnover is 
significantly negatively related to the contemporaneous performance of the firm, 
suggesting that SR firms are more likely to dismiss their CEO when the firm does poorly.  
The intercept of 2.0481 indicates that if an SR firm simply matches the overall market in 
terms of performance in each of the past two years, their CEO faces a dismissal 
probability of 0.114, which is very close to the dismissal probability of 0.111 obtained by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990).13  If the SR firm underperforms the market by 50 percent in 
each of the last two years, the dismissal probability increases to 0.157.  In comparison, 
                                                
12 Although studies of top management changes often discuss turnover in the context of dismissal due to 
poor performance, CEOs may voluntarily leave the firm for other reasons including retirement and other 
job offers that might result from good performance. 
13 The dismissal probability is calculated as p = ex / (1+ ex), where x = a + b(Ri,,t - Rm,t) + c(Ri,t-1 - Rm,t-1). 
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the significance of the inverse relation between turnover and current stock performance 
for the non-SR firms is weaker (p-value = 0.14), and the coefficient is smaller.  The 
intercept of 2.4930 for the non-SR firms corresponds to a dismissal probability of 0.076 
for a firm that performs as well as the market over the last two years.  The turnover 
probability increases to 0.113 for a non-SR firm that underperforms the market by 50 
percent in each of the last two years. 
I also run a variation of the above logistic regression incorporating a dummy 
variable to assess the significance of the difference in turnover probabilities between SR 
firms and non-SR firms.  The dummy variable is also interacted with current and lagged 
performance.  The results of this regression, which are not reported in the paper, indicate 
that the intercepts in the models for the overall sample are significantly different for SR 
and non-SR firms, but the coefficients on performance are not.  In other words, SR firms 
are more likely to experience CEO turnover than are non-SR firms, but this greater 
likelihood of turnover is not related to performance as measured by stock returns. 
Earlier studies provide evidence that age is a relevant factor in CEO turnover.  
Specifically, younger CEOs are more likely to be dismissed following poor firm 
performance than are older CEOs.  For this reason, I analyze separate logistic regressions 
of turnover according to four CEO age groups based on the quartiles of the distribution of 
age in the sample (less than 51 years old, between 51 and 57, between 57 and 61, and 
over 61 years old).  The results of this analysis, presented in columns 2-5 in Table 2.6, 
suggest that the inverse relation between performance and top management turnover is 
greatest for young CEOs.  The youngest age groups for both the SR and non-SR firms are 
the only ones for which the relation between turnover and performance is significant at 
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the 10 percent level or greater.  For SR firms, a significant inverse relation exists between 
turnover of young CEOs (those under 51) and current performance (p-value = 0.10), 
while for non-SR firms, the effects of poor current performance are weaker (p-value = 
0.17), but the inverse relation between turnover and lagged performance is stronger (p-
value = 0.04).  The intercepts of these models indicate that young CEOs of SR firms face 
a dismissal probability of 0.233 if their firm matches the market return over the two most 
recent years, and the corresponding dismissal probability for the non-SR firms is only 
0.140. 
Overall, results from CEO turnover analysis indicate that SR firms are more likely 
to discharge the CEO subsequent to poor performance.  This result corroborates the 
hypothesis that since SR firms have stronger boards in place, they are more likely to 
dismiss a CEO following a decline in shareholder value.  Also, this result may provide 
additional support for why lower pay-for-performance sensitivity is needed at SR firms.   
Hartzel (2001) states that high termination probabilities can substitute for compensation 
sensitivity to firm performance.  Since SR firms are found to have weaker pay-for-
performance relationships and stronger turnover probabilities than non-SR firms, these 
results support Hartzels hypotheses.  The dismissal threat is greater at SR firms and thus 
serves to align CEO and shareholder interests. 
 
2.5.5 Analysis of Stock Options and Risk Taking  
 Effective board monitoring should deter excessive executive risk taking.  Stock 
options have the potential to increase CEO risk taking since the value of the option grant 
is directly linked to return volatility.  The granting of stock options presents an 
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opportunity for a CEO to take risks in order to increase her personal wealth.  Houston and 
James (1995) report that since moral hazard and agency problems in banks are not severe, 
directors offer less incentives that induce risk taking such as stock options and other 
forms of equity-based compensation to executives. Since equity-based compensation may 
induce risk taking on the part of executives, monitoring needs become more critical.  SR 
firms may have lower agency costs and require less monitoring than non-SR firms, so 
equity based compensation should not induce more risk taking by SR CEOs. To test this 
hypothesis, I examine how stock option grants effect risk-taking behavior of the CEO by 
regressing the standard deviation of daily stock returns on lagged values of option grants 
for each sample (current-year option grants are excluded to avoid potential endogeneity 
problems).  To control for factors that may effect stock return volatility I include total 
assets, leverage, and growth opportunities as independent variables.  The results are 
reported in Table 2.6 and indicate that for SR firms, options do not lead to increases in 
firm risk.  The coefficient on the lagged option value is not significant in the model.  
However, results for the matched sample show a strong relationship between lagged 
stock option value and stock return volatility.  The value of the prior years stock options 
for the matched firms is directly related to current daily stock return volatility.  This is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) find that when the 
proportion of equity controlled by bank managers is high, stock price volatility increases.  
They conclude that these banks should have more monitoring on behalf of shareholders 
who may not be well-diversified.  The results in Table 2.6 suggest that options granted at 
non-SR firms and stock return volatility are directly related.  This, as in Saunders, et. al 
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(1990), may imply that board monitoring may not be as effective in non-SR firms as in 
the socially responsible sample. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
This study has examined CEO compensation in SR firms.  These firms exhibit a 
focus on a broad range of stakeholder interests, and shareholders in these firms therefore 
may face a different level of agency costs than shareholders in non-SR firms.  Prior 
literature shows that the boards of directors of SR firms possess more of those 
characteristics traditionally considered to be strong attributes for effective monitoring 
than non-SR boards.  I provide additional evidence of this difference in monitoring by 
examining actions of SR and non-SR board of directors with the hypothesis that SR 
boards should perform their monitoring duties better than non-SR boards. 
I analyze the structure and level of CEO pay over the period 1993-2000 using a 
sample of SR firms in the Domini Social Index and a sample of non-SR firms matched by 
industry and size.  Results of the analysis suggest that boards of SR firms pay executives 
more in terms of annual salary than do non-SR firms, and that this result is heightened in 
small firms.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that SR firms must retain their highly-
skilled employees with higher cash compensation.  The board of directors also sets 
compensation structure, and by introducing equity-based compensation as part of 
executive pay, theoretically they better align manager and shareholder interests.  The 
results indicate no significant difference between the proportion of equity-based 
compensation between SR and non-SR executives.  Socially responsible CEOs command 
a higher salary than non-SR CEOs.  However, I do find that SR CEOs receive 
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significantly less non-traditional compensation, like perquisites, debt forgiveness, and 
other personal benefits than non-SR CEOs. 
Examination of the relationship between CEO compensation and firm 
performance suggests that CEOs of SR firms tend to receive lower cash raises than CEOs 
of non-SR firms, and they also exhibit lower cash pay-performance sensitivity.  Changes 
in total compensation are significantly related to performance, and the magnitude of this 
relation is larger for non-SR firms than for SR firms.  This result illustrates the notion 
that more effective monitoring by a board of directors does not automatically indicate a 
greater pay-for-performance sensitivity.  It instead shows that effective boards are better 
able to recognize whether heightened sensitivity between compensation and performance 
is needed. In the case of SR firms, strong pay-for-performance sensitivity may not be 
necessary in light of the nature of SR firms and their attentiveness to employee welfare.  
The lower pay-performance sensitivity of SR firms may also reflect a tendency for these 
firms to direct financial resources toward socially responsible endeavors following good 
performance, as opposed to increasing executive compensation, or the use of a reward 
system that measures performance by something other than the firms stock return. 
Analysis of CEO turnover indicates that SR firms are more likely to experience 
CEO turnover than are non-SR firms, and this greater likelihood of turnover is related to 
performance when CEO age is considered in the model.  For both SR and non-SR firms, 
the probability of turnover is greatest for young CEOs.  Results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that SR firms will experience more instances of CEO turnover following poor 
performance than non-SR firms. 
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Increases in stock option grants could potentially lead to self-dealing on the part 
of CEOs who wish to increase their personal wealth by taking excessive risks.  This 
situation illustrates a dilemma stemming from agency problems within the firm.  
Therefore, effective board monitoring is necessary to ensure that risk taking at the 
expense of stakeholders does not occur.  I find that while the lagged value of stock 
options is strongly related to stock return volatility for the matched sample, this is not the 
case for SR firms.  This supports the hypothesis that increases in stock options do not 
influence CEOs of socially responsible firms to take on more risk due to effective board 
monitoring. 
Overall, the results suggest that the boards of directors at socially responsible 
firms take actions that differ from those of non-SR boards.  I find that SR boards appear 
to perform their monitoring duties more effectively than do non-SR boards.  The focus of 
good corporate governance has shifted from promoting the shareholders to the promotion 
of what recent authors term the stakeholder society.  The boards of directors at socially 
responsible firms fit this description. This focus on stakeholders enables these boards to 
be effective monitors by aligning managerial and stakeholder interests.    
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Appendix 
 
    
Table 1.1 Summary of Strong Board Characteristics from Prior Research 
Members indicate the number of board members.  The number of board meetings is represented by 
Meetings. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also 
the CEO of the company.  Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of 
board members, or 0 if members are elected annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside 
director holds more than 5% of the outstanding stock of the firm. Family indicates the presence of 
related board members.  Age indicates the age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any 
members on the board are officers of or work with non-profit organizations.  FF represents 
whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. Pinside represents the fraction of 
the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the company.  Poutside indicates 
the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are the percentage of 
directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not insiders.  
Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of directors 
who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents 
the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the 
proportion of women on the board.  GI represents the Governance Index antitakeover score as 
measured by Gompers, et. al. (2003). 
       Relationship with       
Characteristic            board strength  Related Research  
 
Percentage of Outsiders  +          Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) (CHL) 
     Baysinger and Butler (1985) 
     Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) 
     Fama (1980) 
     Beasley (1996) 
     Howton, Howton, and Olson (2001) 
Percentage of Insiders  - CHL (1999) 
     Rosenstein and Wyatt (1995)   
Percentage of gray directors - CHL (1999) 
     Cornett and Davidson (1997)   
Board Size   - Yermack (1996)  
CEO is not chairman  + CHL (1999) 
     Jensen (1993) 
     Yermack (1996)   
Board Diversity   + Carter, Simkins, and Simpson (2003)   
Senior citizens on board  - CHL (1999)   
Busy Directors   + Shivdasani (1993) 
     CHL (1999)  
     Ferris, Jagannathan, and Pritchard (2003)  
Blockholder on board  + Beasley (1996)   
CEO is from founding family           -            Burkart, Panuzi, and Schleifer (2002) 
                                                                        Morck, Strangeland, and Yeong (2000)                        
                                                                        Bacon, Cornett, and Davidson (1997) 
Senior CEO                                       -            CHL (1999) 
Board meetings                                 -            Bacon, Cornett, and Davidson (1997) 
Annual elections                               +           Jensen (1993) 
Family directors                                -            Jensen (1993) 
CEO directors                                   +           Shivdasani (1993) 
Directors with non-profits                + 
Governance Index                            -            Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
                                                                       Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) 
                                                                       McWilliams and Sen (1997)  
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Table 1.2 Sample Description 
Panel A shows the 2001 characteristic averages of the socially responsible (SR) firms and matched firms 
(non-SR) used in the sample.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  All numbers are in millions of dollars 
unless noted otherwise.  Panel B describes the industry breakdown of the full sample (in % of total). 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 
SR firms 
Non-SR 
firms 
Difference 
(t-value) 
Net income 297.21 
(1439.80) 
-39.97 
(3225.00) 
 
337.20 
(1.77)* 
Total assets 20989.00 
(71714.00) 
 
10115.00 
(43412.00) 
 
10874.00 
(2.36)** 
Market value 14383.00 
(35586.00) 
 
5919.60 
(18945.00) 
8464.00 
(3.83)*** 
Price-to-book 3.21 
(9.29) 
 
3.53 
(15.49) 
0.32 
(0.32) 
Annual stock return (%) 15.89 
(58.77) 
 
10.86 
(68.49) 
5.04 
(1.03) 
Return on assets (%) 3.08 
(12.46) 
 
-3.16 
(41.47) 
6.24 
(2.67)*** 
Return on Equity 10.71 
(93.21) 
 
-49.47 
(771.73) 
60.18 
(1.44) 
Panel B: Industries   
 Full sample N (in each sample) 
Retail 
 
20.6% 81 
Machinery 
 
16.0 63 
Recreation 
 
7.4 29 
Chemicals 
 
8.9 35 
Transportation 
 
6.1 24 
Financial 15.5 
 
61 
Healthcare 6.9 
 
27 
Utilities 18.8 74 
 
Total 100.0% 394 
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Table 1.3 Correlation Matrices for Both Samples 
Number reported is Spearman correlation coefficient for each pairwise correlation from the SR sample 
and number in parentheses is the correlation coefficient using the non-SR sample. Members indicate the 
number of board members.  The number of board meetings is represented by Meetings. Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the company.  
Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if members are 
elected annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds more than 5% of the 
outstanding stock of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  Age indicates the 
age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or work with non-
profit organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. 
Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the 
company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are 
the percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not 
insiders.  Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of 
directors who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents 
the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion 
of women on the board. N = 394 SR firms and 394 non-SR firms. 
Panel A: Correlations 
 Members Meetings Duality Terms Block Family Age NP 
Members 1.0 0.046 
(0.126)** 
 
-0.058 
(0.000) 
0.133*** 
(0.154)*** 
0.055 
(-0.017) 
0.117** 
(0.039) 
0.067 
(.121)** 
0.173*** 
(0.233)*** 
Meetings  1.0 0.038 
(-0.016) 
 
-0.012 
(0.109)** 
-0.031 
(-0.001) 
-0.200*** 
(-0.157)*** 
-0.032 
(-0.037) 
0.098* 
(0.112)** 
Duality   1.0 -0.069 
(0.034) 
 
-0.055 
(-0.095)* 
-0.177*** 
(-0.078) 
0.241*** 
(.177)*** 
0.059 
(0.093)* 
Terms    1.0 -0.046 
(-0.053) 
 
0.004 
(-0.051) 
0.011 
(-0.032) 
0.032 
(-0.008) 
Block     1.0 0.106 
(0.014) 
 
-0.034 
(-.113)** 
-0.040 
(-0.035) 
Family      1.0 0.079 
(.113)** 
 
-0.028 
(-0.017) 
Age       1.0 0.092* 
(0.094)* 
 
NP        1.0 
 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.3 (continued) 
Number reported is Spearman correlation coefficient for each pairwise correlation from the SR sample 
and number in parentheses is the correlation coefficient using the non-SR sample. Members indicate the 
number of board members.  The number of board meetings is represented by Meetings. Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the company.  
Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if members are 
elected annually.  Blockr indicates whether or not an outside director holds more than 5% of the 
outstanding stock of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  Age indicates the 
age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or work with non-
profit organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. 
Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the 
company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are 
the percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not 
insiders.  Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of 
directors who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents 
the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion 
of women on the board. N = 394 SR firms and 394 non-SR firms. 
Panel B: Correlations 
 Members Meetings Duality Terms Block Family Age NP 
FF -0.124** 
(-.173)*** 
-0.122** 
(-0.046) 
0.028 
(0.072) 
-0.041 
(-0.065) 
-0.068 
(-0.008) 
0.103** 
(0.221)*** 
-0.006 
(0.060) 
0.010 
(-0.025) 
 
Pinside 
 
-0.245*** 
(0.137)*** 
 
-0.194*** 
(-.148)*** 
-0.210*** 
(-.163)*** 
-0.063 
(-0.102)** 
0.029 
(0.004) 
0.260*** 
(0.261)*** 
0.042 
(0.076) 
-0.021 
(-0.065) 
Poutside 
 
0.202*** 
(0.193)*** 
 
0.178*** 
(0.194)*** 
0.142*** 
(0.133)*** 
0.068 
(0.178)*** 
-0.001 
(-0.065) 
-0.282*** 
(-0.289)*** 
-0.040 
(-0.013) 
0.004 
(0.116)** 
Pgray 
 
0.033 
(0.133)*** 
 
-0.046 
(0.036) 
0.052 
(0.026) 
-0.046 
(-0.042) 
-0.020 
(0.052) 
0.131*** 
(-0.030) 
0.041 
(0.077) 
0.055 
(0.050) 
Psenior 
 
-0.062 
(0.107)** 
 
-0.119** 
(-0.074) 
-0.037 
(-0.099)* 
0.047 
(-0.014) 
0.077 
(-0.034) 
0.209*** 
(0.201)*** 
0.152*** 
(0.180)*** 
-0.038 
(-0.011) 
Pbusy 0.111** 
(0.181)*** 
0.226*** 
(0.147)*** 
0.101** 
(0.082) 
-0.019 
(0.065) 
-0.038 
(-0.015) 
-0.205*** 
(-0.190)*** 
-0.086* 
(0.029) 
0.182*** 
(0.187)*** 
 
Pceos 0.191*** 
(0.133)*** 
0.056 
(0.090) 
0.110** 
(0.147)*** 
0.043 
(0.018) 
-0.076 
(-0.072) 
-0.219*** 
(-0.133)*** 
-0.063 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.093)* 
 
Pfemale 
0.063 
(0.285)*** 
0.108** 
(0.094)* 
0.047 
(0.088)* 
0.002 
(0.086)* 
-0.026 
(-0.066) 
-0.057 
(-0.046) 
-0.019 
(0.021) 
0.195*** 
(0.291)*** 
 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.3 (continued) 
Number reported is Spearman correlation coefficient for each pairwise correlation from the SR sample 
and number in parentheses is the correlation coefficient using the non-SR sample. Members indicate the 
number of board members.  The number of board meetings is represented by Meetings. Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the company.  
Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if members are 
elected annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds more than 5% of the 
outstanding stock of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  Age indicates the 
age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or work with non-
profit organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. 
Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the 
company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are 
the percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not 
insiders.  Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of 
directors who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents 
the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion 
of women on the board. N = 394 SR firms and 394 non-SR firms. 
Panel C: Correlations 
 FF Pinside Poutside Pgray Psenior Pbusy Pceos pfemale 
FF 1.0 0.171*** 
(0.219)*** 
-0.149*** 
(-.251)*** 
0.014 
(0.005) 
0.022 
(0.058) 
-0.116** 
(-0.144)*** 
-0.166*** 
(-0.118)** 
-0.073 
(-0.061) 
 
Pinside 
 
 1.0 -0.851*** 
(-.666)*** 
0.077 
(-0.093)* 
 
0.274*** 
(0.138)*** 
-0.291*** 
(-0.203)*** 
-0.377*** 
(-0.232)*** 
-0.180*** 
(-.145)*** 
Poutside 
 
  1.0 -0.529*** 
(-0.385)*** 
 
-0.260*** 
(-0.061) 
0.257*** 
(0.251)*** 
0.329*** 
(0.309)*** 
0.129** 
(0.234)*** 
Pgray 
 
   1.0 0.117** 
(-0.024) 
 
-0.051 
(0.052) 
-0.071 
(-0.018) 
0.009 
(-0.003) 
Psenior 
 
    1.0 -0.275*** 
(-0.114)** 
 
-0.267*** 
(-0.196)*** 
-0.179*** 
(-0.081) 
Pbusy      1.0 0.221*** 
(0.184)*** 
0.178*** 
(0.173)*** 
 
Pceos       1.0 0.102** 
(0.129)** 
 
Pfemale        1.0 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.4 Difference in Means Tests 
Sample consists of 394 firms listed on the Domini 400 Index of socially responsible firms (SR) in the year 
2000-2001 and 394 firms matched on industry and size (Non-SR).  The number of board meetings is 
represented by Meetings. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is 
also the CEO of the company.  Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board 
members, or 0 if members are elected annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds 
more than 5% of the outstanding stock of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  
Age indicates the age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or 
work with non-profit organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding 
family. Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the 
company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are the 
percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not insiders.  
Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of directors who are 
on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents the percentage of 
outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion of women on the 
board. GI is the Governance Index score as measured by Gompers, et. al. (2003). A negative t-statistic (or 
Wilcoxon Z-statistic) indicates that the non-SR variable is less than the SR variable, and a positive t-statistic 
indicates SR is less than non-SR. 
 
Variable SR Mean 
(Std Error) 
Non-SR Mean 
(Std Error) 
Difference 
(SR  Non-SR) 
Paired 
t-statistic 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum Z 
Members 10.43 
(3.02) 
9.56 
(3.30) 
 
0.87 4.41*** 4.62*** 
Meetings 7.47 
(3.16) 
 
7.34 
(3.31) 
0.13 0.61 1.21 
Duality 
 
0.72 
(0.45) 
0.78 
(0.41) 
 
-0.06 -2.07** -1.98** 
Terms 
 
0.57 
(0.49) 
0.63 
(0.48) 
 
-0.06 -1.58 -1.70* 
Block 
 
 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
0.00 0.00 -0.03 
 
Family 
 
 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
0.00 0.10 -0.06 
Age 
 
 
55.63 
(7.48) 
55.83 
(8.08) 
-0.20 -0.42 0.03 
NP 
 
 
0.32 
(0.47) 
0.31 
(0.46) 
0.01 0.38 0.36 
FF 
 
0.08 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
 
-0.07 -3.69***   -3.50*** 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.4 (continued) 
Sample consists of 394 firms listed on the Domini 400 Index of socially responsible firms (SR) in the year 
2000-2001 and 394 firms matched on industry and size (Non-SR).  The number of board meetings is 
represented by Meetings. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is 
also the CEO of the company.  Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board 
members, or 0 if members are elected annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds 
more than 5% of the outstanding stock of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  
Age indicates the age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or 
work with non-profit organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding 
family. Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the 
company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are the 
percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not insiders.  
Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of directors who are 
on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents the percentage of 
outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion of women on the 
board. GI is the Governance Index score as measured by Gompers, et. al. (2003). A negative t-statistic (or 
Wilcoxon Z-statistic) indicates that the non-SR variable is less than the SR variable, and a positive t-statistic 
indicates SR is less than non-SR. 
 
Variable SR Mean 
(Std Error) 
Non-SR Mean 
(Std Error) 
Difference 
(SR  Non-SR) 
Paired 
t-statistic 
Wilcoxon 
rank sum Z 
Pinside 0.23 
(0.14) 
 
0.31 
(0.16) 
-0.08 -5.46*** -4.76*** 
Poutside 
 
 
0.71 
(0.16) 
0.61 
(0.17) 
0.10 8.72*** 8.26*** 
Pgray 
 
 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.02 -2.53** -1.49* 
Psenior 
 
 
0.10 
(0.13) 
0.10 
(0.12) 
0.00 0.95 0.44 
Pbusy 
 
 
0.18 
(0.17) 
0.16 
(0.16) 
0.02 2.35** 2.32** 
Pceos 
 
 
0.18 
(0.15) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
0.02 1.92* 1.52* 
Pfemale 
 
 
0.13 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
0.05 8.39*** 7.65*** 
GI 
 
9.68 
(2.60) 
9.40 
(2.76) 
0.28 2.44**  
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.5 Logistic Regressions 
Sample consists of 394 firms listed on the Domini 400 Index of socially responsible firms (SR) in the year 
2000-2001 and 394 firms matched on industry and size (NSR). Dependent variable is firm type, a binary 
variable equal to 1 if firm is from socially responsible sample, or 0 otherwise.  Equation analyzed is: prob(y 
= 1) = π = eXβ / (1 + eXβ), where X is the vector of sixteen governance structure variables as follows. 
Members indicate the number of board members.  The number of board meetings is represented by 
Meetings. Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO 
of the company.  Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if 
members are elected annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds more than 5% of 
the outstanding stock of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  Age indicates 
the age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or work with 
non-profit organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. 
Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the 
company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are 
the percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not 
insiders.  Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of 
directors who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents 
the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion 
of women on the board. GI is the Governance Index score as measured by Gompers, et. al. (2003).  Number 
in parentheses is chi-square test statistic. 
Independent variable Expected sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 
 
 
 -1.34 
(2.48) 
-2.24 
(29.78)*** 
-1.80 
(29.78)* 
Members 
 
 
- -0.015 
(0.18) 
0.03 
(1.27) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
Meetings 
 
 
- -0.01 
(0.02) 
 0.00 
(0.02) 
Duality 
 
 
- -0.41 
(3.42)* 
-0.54 
(8.69)*** 
-0.55 
(5.04)** 
Terms 
 
 
- -0.39 
(4.61)** 
-0.46 
(8.16)*** 
-0.68 
(9.77)*** 
Block + -0.02 
(0.01) 
 -0.08 
(0.03) 
Family 
 
 
- 0.29 
(1.29)* 
 0.29 
(0.96) 
Age 
 
 
- -0.00 
(0.04) 
 -0.00 
(0.02) 
NP + -0.45 
(4.84)** 
 -0.40 
(3.51)* 
FF 
 
 
- -0.63  
(4.54)** 
-0.36 
(1.92) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.5 (continued) 
Sample consists of 394 firms listed on the Domini 400 Index of socially responsible firms (SR) in the year 
2000-2001 and 394 firms matched on industry and size (NSR). Dependent variable is firm type, a binary 
variable equal to 1 if firm is from socially responsible sample, or 0 otherwise.  Equation analyzed is: prob(y 
= 1) = π = eXβ / (1 + eXβ), where X is the vector of sixteen governance structure variables as follows. 
Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the 
company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are 
the percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not 
insiders.  Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of 
directors who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents 
the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion 
of women on the board. GI is the Governance Index score as measured by Gompers, et. al. (2003). 
 
Independent variable Expected sign Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Pinside 
 
 
- -1.92 
(8.06)*** 
  
Poutside 
 
 
+  3.30 
(38.05)*** 
2.59 
(14.60)*** 
Pgray 
 
 
- -1.73 
(3.13)* 
  
Psenior 
 
 
- 0.87 
(1.42) 
 0.15 
(0.04) 
Pbusy + 0.03 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.05) 
 
0.60 
(0.82) 
Pceos 
 
 
+ -0.48 
(0.51) 
-0.46 
(0.61) 
-1.07 
(2.16) 
Pfemale + 5.91 
(28.90)*** 
 
5.83 
(36.67)*** 
5.49 
(20.15)*** 
Log market value  0.32 
(11.92)*** 
  
Beta  -0.07 
(0.11) 
  
Log total assets  0.02 
(0.05) 
  
GI 
 
 
   0.09 
(5.14)** 
Percent concordant  73.5 76.0 70.9 
Likelihood ratio  123.79*** 130.03*** 70.92*** 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.6 Determinants of Director Compensation 
The sample consists of 299 firms from the Domini Social Index (SR firms) and 211 firms matched to the 
SR firms by industry and size.  Total options is the sum of the number of options granted to each director 
and the number of extra options granted to certain directors.  Annual retainer is the cash payment for each 
director on the board. Growth is measured by capital expenditures divided by total assets.  Members 
indicates the number of board members.  Duality is a dummy variable take the value of 1 if the chairman 
of the board is also the CEO of the company.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms 
founding family.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of directors who are on three or more other boards (six or 
more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs 
of other firms.  Pfemale is the proportion of female directors on the board.  Poutside indicates the fraction 
of the board that is not affiliated with the company. 
 SR 
(t-value) 
Non-SR 
(t-value) 
Difference 
(t-value) 
Dependent variable = Annual retainer 
Intercept 10.618 
(2.08)** 
 
5.186 
(1.15) 
5.186 
(1.02) 
Sales 0.000 
(3.00)*** 
 
0.000 
(4.46)*** 
-0.000 
(-2.57)** 
Growth 1.982 
(0.22) 
 
-0.511 
(-1.06) 
2.493 
(0.30) 
Return on assets 0.214 
(1.86)** 
 
0.167 
(1.45) 
0.047 
(0.28) 
Stock return 0.006 
(0.35) 
 
0.022 
(1.69)* 
-0.015 
(-0.67) 
Members 0.867 
(2.40)** 
 
0.719 
(1.98)** 
0.147 
(0.28) 
Duality 0.362 
(0.18) 
 
0.317 
(0.14) 
0.045 
(0.01) 
FF -5.724 
(-1.81)* 
 
0.101 
(0.04) 
-5.825 
(-1.42) 
Pbusy 8.522 
(1.65) 
 
-1.795 
(-0.30) 
10.316 
(1.26) 
Pceos -0.666 
(-0.11) 
 
4.242 
(0.63) 
-4.909 
(-0.51) 
Pfemale 14.166 
(1.55) 
 
1.203 
(0.11) 
12.963 
(0.85) 
Poutside -2.309 
(-0.38) 
 
5.943 
(1.05) 
-8.252 
(-0.97) 
Adj. R2 
F 
10.21% 
4.09*** 
13.07% 
3.89*** 
12.24% 
4.10*** 
N 299 211 510 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.7 Regressions of KLD Score on Board Characteristics 
Sample consists of firms listed on the Domini 400 Index of socially responsible firms (SR) in the year 
2000-2001 and firms matched on industry and size (Non-SR). Dependent variable is the total social 
responsibility score given by KLD. Members indicate the number of board members.  Duality is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the company.  
Term is a binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if members are 
elected annually.   FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family.  
Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.    Pbusy indicates the 
percentage of directors who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  
Pceos represents the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales 
represents the proportion of women on the board.  T-value in parentheses.   
 Sample 
Independent variable All firms SR firms Non-SR firms Difference 
Intercept 
 
 
-0.016 
(-0.02) 
-0.137 
(-0.16) 
-1.469 
(-0.54) 
 
Members 
 
 
0.091 
(1.86)* 
0.022 
(0.42) 
0.156 
(1.42) 
-0.134 
(-1.23) 
Duality 
 
 
-0.358 
(-1.28) 
-0.231 
(-0.84) 
-0.384 
(-0.42) 
0.153 
(0.18) 
Terms 
 
 
-0.424 
(-1.73)* 
-0.328 
(-1.31) 
0.411 
(0.60) 
-0.740 
(-1.16) 
FF 
 
-0.019 
(-0.04) 
 
-0.269 
(-0.58) 
0.774 
(0.74) 
 
-1.043 
(-1.03) 
Poutside 
 
 
1.549 
(1.82)* 
1.720 
(1.92)* 
-2.215 
(-1.01) 
3.935 
(1.89)* 
Pbusy 
 
 
-0.093 
(-0.12) 
-0.771 
(-1.01) 
1.373 
(0.61) 
-2.143 
(-1.04) 
Pceos 
 
 
-1.270 
(-1.48) 
-1.193 
(-1.37) 
-0.233 
(-0.09) 
-0.960 
(-0.41) 
Pfemale 7.742 
(6.07)*** 
6.427 
(5.10)*** 
5.502 
(1.29) 
 
0.925 
(0.24) 
Log market value 0.148 
(1.22) 
0.220 
(1.76)* 
0.194 
(0.58) 
 
0.026 
(0.08) 
Beta 0.112 
(0.41) 
0.003 
(0.01) 
0.012 
(0.02) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.01) 
Log total assets -0.351 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.262 
(-2.01)** 
-0.273 
(-0.98) 
 
0.011 
(0.04) 
Adj. R2 
F 
N 
9.94% 
5.06*** 
405 
7.89% 
3.52*** 
324 
-2.81% 
0.80 
80 
18.19% 
4.92*** 
405 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.8 Tests for Difference in Means with Reduced Samples 
The full sample consists of 394 firms listed on the Domini 400 Index of socially responsible firms (SR) in 
the year 2000-2001 and 394 firms matched on industry and size (NSR).  This is then reduced to firms 
cross-listed on the Calvert Social Index Fund (181 pairs) and matched firms within 20% of each others 
market value (101 pairs). The number of board meetings is represented by Meetings. Duality is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the company.  Term is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if members are elected 
annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds more than 5% of the outstanding stock 
of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  Age indicates the age of the CEO.  
NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or work with non-profit 
organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. Pinside 
represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the company.  
Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are the 
percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not insiders.  
Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of directors who 
are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents the percentage 
of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion of women on the 
board.  T-values are reported with p-values in parentheses below.  
                                                         Sample 
Independent variable Calvert cross-listed firms MV within 20% 
Members 
 
 
4.195 
(0.000)a 
-0.960 
(0.339) 
Meetings 
 
 
-1.614 
(0.108) 
0.140 
(0.889) a 
Duality 
 
 
-1.760 
(0.080) a 
-2.387 
(0.019) a 
Terms 
 
 
-2.977 
(0.030)a 
0.705 
(0.482) 
Block 
 
-0.229 
(0.819) 
0.962 
(0.338)a 
 
Family 
 
 
0.744 
(0.458)a 
0.847 
(0.400)a 
Age 
 
 
-0.279 
(0.781)a 
-0.960 
(0.338)a 
NP 
 
 
0.639 
(0.524)a 
-0.847 
(0.399) 
FF -2.372 
(0.190) 
-2.594 
(0.011)a 
 
Pinside 
 
-3.922 
(0.000)a 
-2.196 
(0.030)a 
a indicates that the t-test has the same sign and significance as the full sample results from Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.8 (continued) 
The full sample consists of 394 firms listed on the Domini 400 Index of socially responsible firms (SR) in 
the year 2000-2001 and 394 firms matched on industry and size (NSR).  This is then reduced to firms 
cross-listed on the Calvert Social Index Fund (181 pairs) and matched firms within 20% of each others 
market value (101 pairs). The number of board meetings is represented by Meetings. Duality is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the company.  Term is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if members are elected 
annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds more than 5% of the outstanding stock 
of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  Age indicates the age of the CEO.   
NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or work with non-profit 
organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. Pinside 
represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the company.  
Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are the 
percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not insiders.  
Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of directors who 
are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents the percentage 
of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion of women on the 
board.  T-values are reported with p-values in parentheses below. 
 
                                                         Sample 
Independent variable Calvert cross-listed firms MV within 20% 
Poutside 7.436 
(0.000)a 
2.560 
(0.011)a 
 
Pgray -3.270  
(0.001)a 
 
-1.231 
(0.221) 
Psenior -0.413 
(0.681) 
1.282 
(0.203) a 
 
Pbusy 2.150 
(0.330) 
-1.113 
(0.268) 
 
Pceos 2.965 
(0.030)a 
0.601 
(0.549) 
 
Pfemale 6.858 
(0.000)a 
4.543 
(0.000)a 
 
N 362 202 
a indicates that the t-test has the same sign and significance as the full sample results from Table 1.4. 
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Table 1.9 Proportion of Outside Directors 
Estimates of cross sectional regressions relating each board characteristic and log(market value) to percent 
of outside directors.  Model 1 uses all board characteristic variables as independent variables.  Model 2 
uses the significant characteristics as specified in the univariate t-tests as independent variables.  Model 3 
uses the significant characteristics as specified in the logistic regression as independent variables. Type 
indicates whether the firm is socially responsible (1) or from the matched sample (0). Members indicate the 
number of board members.  The number of board meetings is represented by Meetings. Duality is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO of the company.  Term is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if there is staggered election of board members, or 0 if members are elected 
annually.  Block indicates whether or not an outside director holds more than 5% of the outstanding stock 
of the firm. Family indicates the presence of related board members.  Age indicates the age of the CEO.   
NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or work with non-profit 
organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding family. Pinside 
represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of the company.  
Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray are the 
percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not insiders.  
Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of directors who 
are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents the percentage 
of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion of women on the 
board. 
 
 Dependent variable = proportion of outside directors 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 0.815 
(35.41)*** 
0.802 
(56.06)*** 
0.457 
(15.08)*** 
 
0.872 
(49.39)*** 
Log market value -0.006 
(-3.63)*** 
-0.005 
(-2.90)*** 
0.001 
(0.32) 
 
-0.007 
(-4.10)*** 
Type 0.032  
(5.98)*** 
0.031 
(5.75)*** 
0.074 
(5.79)*** 
 
0.021 
(4.18)*** 
Members 0.012 
(12.65)*** 
0.011 
(11.97)*** 
 
 
 
0.008 
(9.18)*** 
Meetings 0.001 
(1.20) 
 
  0.010 
(1.65)* 
Duality 0.008 
(1.36) 
0.008 
(1.35) 
0.037 
(2.68)*** 
 
0.004 
(0.74) 
Terms 0.009  
(1.81)*  
 
0.011 
(2.06)** 
0.032 
(2.68)*** 
 
Block 0.007 
(0.65) 
 
   
Family -0.033 
(-4.65)*** 
 
   
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 1.9 (continued) 
Estimates of cross sectional regressions relating each board characteristic and log(market value) to percent 
of outside directors.  Model 1 uses all board characteristic variables as independent variables.  Model 2 
uses the significant characteristics as specified in the univariate t-tests as independent variables.  Model 3 
uses the significant characteristics as specified in the logistic regression as independent variables. Age 
indicates the age of the CEO.   NP signifies whether or not any members on the board are officers of or 
work with non-profit organizations.  FF represents whether or not the CEO belongs to the firms founding 
family. Pinside represents the fraction of the total board members who are (or have been) also officers of 
the company.  Poutside indicates the fraction of the board that is not affiliated with the company.  Pgray 
are the percentage of directors who have substantial business relationships with the company, yet are not 
insiders.  Psenior includes any director that is over the age of 69.  Pbusy indicates the percentage of 
directors who are on three or more other boards (six or more if board member is retired).  Pceos represents 
the percentage of outside directors who are also CEOs of other firms.  Pfemales represents the proportion 
of women on the board. 
 
 Dependent variable = proportion of outside directors 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Age -0.000 
(-1.13) 
 
   
NP 0.004 
(0.41) 
 
 0.000 
(0.04) 
 
FF -0.006 
(-0.83) 
 
-0.011 
(-1.43) 
 -0.007 
(-0.84) 
Pinside -0.759 
(-41.32)*** 
-0.777 
(-43.08)*** 
 
 -0.837 
(-45.45)*** 
Pgray 0.922 
(-34.52)*** 
-0.929 
(-34.59)*** 
 
 -0.962 
(-37.05)*** 
Psenior 0.027 
(1.32) 
 
 -0.178 
(-3.87)*** 
 
Pbusy 0.042 
(2.56)** 
0.052 
(3.21)*** 
 
 0.042 
(2.72)*** 
Pceos 0.060 
(3.14)*** 
0.062 
(3.32)*** 
 
 0.065 
(3.73)*** 
Pfemale 0.052 
(1.78)* 
0.048 
(1.65)* 
0.208 
(2.99)*** 
 
0.025 
(0.92) 
Governance Index    0.001 
(0.85) 
 
Adj. R2 
F 
N 
85.9% 
249.92*** 
694 
85.5% 
376.27*** 
701 
17.5% 
19.71*** 
702 
89.9% 
381.92*** 
517 
***, **, * indicates significance at the .01, .05, and .10 level, respectively. 
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Table 2.1 Firm Characteristic Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for firm characteristics of a sample of 158 socially responsible (SR) 
firms and 158 matched (non-SR) firms in the year 2000.  Panel A shows the firm 
characteristics.  Tobins Q is calculated by summing the market value of common stock, 
book value of long-term debt, book value of short-term debt, and book value of 
preferred stock divided by total assets.  Size is total assets.  Leverage is calculated by 
total debt/total assets.  Growth opportunities is capital expenditures/total assets. Panel B 
lists board of directors characteristics. The number of directors on the board is the board 
size, and CEO/Chair Duality is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the CEO is 
also the board chair, 0 otherwise.  Percent busy represents directors who are on  > 3 
other boards.  Percent CEO directors are those directors who are CEOs of other 
companies.  CEO ownership represents the percent of outstanding equity owned by the 
CEO. 
 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
 Sample 
 SR firms Non-SR firms p-value 
Stock return, % 14.63 17.14 0.67 
    
Return on assets, % 5.60 6.22 0.47 
    
Tobins Q 1.85 1.72 0.66 
    
Size 4064.31 2751.77 0.03 
    
Leverage 0.46 0.46 0.89 
    
Growth 
Opportunities 
0.06 0.05 0.33 
 
 
   
Panel B: Board characteristics 
Board Size 10.82 10.66 0.68 
    
CEO/Chair Duality 0.74 0.84 0.04 
    
% Outside Directors 71.8 65.7 0.00 
    
% Female Directors 12.6 8.7 0.00 
    
% Busy Directors 18.5 17.0 0.42 
    
% CEO Directors 20.1 20.3 0.91 
    
CEO equity 
ownership, % 
1.76 3.67 0.01 
    
CEO Age 56.18 57.23 0.21 
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Table 2.2 Compensation Summary Statistics 
This table shows the summary statistics for CEO compensation.  All figures are in 
thousands of dollars (except % equity-based compensation) adjusted for inflation with 
2000 as the base year.   The sample consists of 1206 socially responsible (SR) firms and 
1101 matched (non-SR) firms from 1993-2000.   Other annual compensation includes 
annual compensation that is not categorized as salary or bonus.  Restricted stock 
represents the value of stock grants whose resale is barred for 3-5 years.  Percentage of 
equity-based compensation is the sum of values of the awards from grants of new stock 
options, grants of restricted stock, and long-term incentive plans divided by total 
compensation.  LTIP represents the value of CEO long-term incentive plans. All other 
compensation includes, for example, severance payments, debt forgiveness, 401K 
contributions and life insurance premiums. Cash compensation is the sum of annual 
salary and bonus compensation.  
 
 
 
SR Firms 
(mean) 
Non-SR 
Firms 
(mean) 
T-test for 
difference in 
means 
(p-value) 
Median two-
sample test 
(p-value) 
Salary 
 
750.73 715.34 0.017 0.002 
Bonus 
 
835.20 854.26 0.836 0.851 
Other Annual 
 
37.96 66.57 0.001 0.065 
Value of Restricted 
Stock 
 
1024.30 371.52 0.270 0.035 
Value of Stock 
Options 
 
2859.90 2713.60 0.815 0.836 
LTIP 
 
212.68 227.28 0.693 0.327 
All other 
compensation 
 
217.17 279.87 0.539 0.036 
Cash compensation 
 
1585.90 1569.60 0.864 0.153 
Total compensation 
 
5947.40 5226.20 0.441 0.589 
% Equity-based 
compensation 
41.12 40.91 0.847 0.533 
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Table 2.3 Compensation Summary Statistics by Size 
This table shows the selected summary statistics for CEO compensation by firm size.  All figures are in 
thousands of dollars (except % equity-based compensation) adjusted for inflation with 2000 as the base 
year.  Panel A includes firms with total assets greater than median total assets (large).  Panel B includes 
firms with total assets less than median total assets (small). The sample consists of socially responsible 
(SR) firms and matched (non-SR) firms from 1993-2000.  Other annual compensation includes annual 
compensation that is not categorized as salary or bonus.  Restricted stock represents the value of stock 
grants whose resale is barred for 3-5 years.  Cash compensation equals salary plus bonus. Percentage of 
equity-based compensation is the sum of values of the awards from grants of new stock options, grants of 
restricted stock, and long-term incentive plans divided by total compensation.  
  
 SR Firms 
(mean) 
Non-SR Firms 
(mean) 
Difference 
(p-value) 
Panel A: Large firms    
Salary 
 
884.39 881.86 0.911 
Bonus 
 
1178.90 1154.50 0.892 
Other annual 
 
48.02 112.47 0.000 
Value of Restricted Stock 
 
1789.90 629.02 0.339 
Value of Stock Options 
 
4454.10 4068.20 0.758 
Cash compensation 
 
2063.20 2036.40 0.882 
Total compensation 
 
8939.80 7721.50 0.516 
% Equity-based compensation 0.466 
 
0.470 0.759 
N 647 500 1147 
 
Panel B: Small firms 
   
Salary 
 
603.91 576.81 0.076 
Bonus 
 
457.71 604.48 0.007 
Other annual 
 
26.91 28.38 0.845 
Value of Restricted Stock 
 
183.41 157.30 0.533 
Value of Stock Options 
 
1099.40 1583.70 0.048 
Cash compensation 
 
1061.60 1181.30 0.052 
Total compensation 
 
2643.00 3144.80 0.088 
% Equity-based compensation 
 
0.351 0.358 0.681 
N 601 589 1190 
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Table 2.4 Pay-Performance Analysis 
This table presents the results of a regression of the change in CEO compensation on 
contemporaneous and lagged changes in shareholder wealth over the period 1993-2000.  
Compensation values are in thousands of dollars, and shareholder wealth is in millions of 
dollars.  T-statistics are in parentheses. ∆ in shareholder wealth is computed as stock 
returnt · market valuet-1. 
 
Panel A: Socially Responsible Firms 
 Dependent variable 
 ∆ salary ∆ bonus ∆ (salary + 
bonus) 
∆ Total pay  
Intercept 
 
22.576 55.121 77.697 495.911  
∆ shareholder 
wealth 
0.00000003 
(0.13) 
 
0.00000159 
(1.79)* 
0.00000162 
(1.69)* 
-0.00000230 
(0.28) 
 
∆ shareholder 
wealth (lagged) 
-0.00000009 
(0.25) 
0.0000001 
(0.10) 
0.00000003 
(0.02) 
0.0000257 
(2.14)** 
 
      
Adj. R2 -0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.5%  
      
Panel B: Non-SR Firms 
Intercept 
 
25.589 66.409 91.998 325.337  
∆ shareholder 
wealth 
0.00000031 
(0.32) 
 
0.00000978 
(3.31)*** 
0.0000101 
(3.15)*** 
0.000179 
(6.32)*** 
 
∆ shareholder 
wealth (lagged) 
-0.00000007 
(0.08) 
 
-0.00000074 
(0.25) 
-0.00000081 
(0.25) 
0.0000111 
(0.33) 
 
      
Adj. R2 -0.2% 1.2% 1.1% 4.3% 
 
 
Panel C: Difference between samples  
∆ shareholder 
wealth 
-0.00000028 
(-0.29) 
 
-0.00000819 
(-2.70)*** 
-0.00000847 
(-2.58)** 
-0.00018106 
(-6.37)*** 
 
∆ shareholder 
wealth (lagged) 
-0.00000002 
(-0.02) 
0.00000086 
(0.27) 
0.00000346 
(0.24) 
0.00001465 
(0.42) 
 
*,**,*** denotes significance at the .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Analysis of CEO Turnover 
This table presents the results of a logistic regression examining the relationship between 
CEO turnover and firm performance.  Turnover is measured as a binary variable equal to 
one if the CEO is serving in her last fiscal year and zero otherwise.  Performance is 
measured as the difference between a firms stock return during the fiscal year and the 
corresponding return on the CRSP value-weighted market index.  P-values are in 
parentheses. 
 
Panel A: Socially Responsible Firms 
 Age of CEO 
 All ages Age < 51  51< Age < 57 57 < Age < 61 Age > 61 
Intercept 
 
-2.048 -1.191 -1.852 -2.670 -3.562 
Performance (year t) -0.704 
(0.02) 
 
-0.796 
(0.10) 
-0.713 
(0.18) 
0.001 
(0.99) 
-1.571 
(0.26) 
Performance (year t-1) -0.032 
(0.90) 
-0.036 
(0.94) 
0.351 
(0.44) 
0.115 
(0.80) 
-1.406 
(0.32) 
      
Sample size 944 192 310 215 227 
Turnover incidents 
 
113 47 44 14 8 
Panel B: Non-SR Firms 
Intercept 
 
-2.493 -1.815 -2.475 -3.005 -3.792 
Performance (year t) -0.466 
(0.14) 
 
-0.610 
(0.17) 
-0.556 
(0.33) 
0.069 
(0.94) 
-1.190 
(0.42) 
Performance (year t-1) -0.408 
(0.25) 
 
-1.191 
(0.04) 
-0.394 
(0.54) 
0.728 
(0.36) 
0.226 
(0.82) 
Sample size 920 242 272 204 202 
Turnover incidents 
 
71 35 21 10 5 
 
 
 
  
100
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 Stock Return Volatility and Options Analysis 
This table presents regressions of the standard deviation of daily stock returns on lagged 
values of total option grants.  Sample is from 1993-2000.  Control variables include 
logged total assets, leverage, and growth opportunities (measured as capital expenditures 
divided by total assets).  P-values in parentheses below coefficients. 
 
 Sample 
 Full sample SR firms Non-SR firms 
Intercept 
 
0.026 
(0.52) 
 
0.032 
(0.68) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
Option valuet-1 0.002 
(0.52) 
 
0.002 
(0.80) 
0.003 
(0.00) 
Total assets -0.002 
(0.73) 
 
-0.004 
(0.75) 
-0.003 
(0.00) 
Leverage 
 
0.011 
(0.73) 
 
0.046 
(0.64) 
-0.003 
(0.11) 
Growth opportunities 
 
 
-0.105 
(0.41) 
-0.189 
(0.40) 
-0.015 
(0.05) 
Adj. R2 -0.002 -0.004 0.251 
N 1220 645 573 
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